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Executive Summary 
In this study, we examine the arrangements for and experiences of end-use loads providing 
ancillary services (AS) in five electricity markets: Australia, the United Kingdom (UK), the 
Nordic market, and the ERCOT and PJM markets in the United States. Our objective in 
undertaking this review of international experience was to identify specific approaches or market 
designs that have enabled customer loads to effectively deliver various ancillary services (AS) 
products.  We hope that this report will contribute to the ongoing discussion in the U.S. and 
elsewhere regarding what institutional and technical developments are needed to ensure that 
customer loads can meaningfully participate in all wholesale electricity markets. 
 
Approach   
 
We conducted an initial literature review of international electricity markets and focused on 
those markets that had significant experience with load participation in providing ancillary 
services.  We reviewed technical reports, market data, tariffs, and operating protocols as well as 
studies and evaluations prepared by consultants. Our literature review covered reliability rules, 
market structure and design, rules, requirements and arrangements for ancillary services, and 
customer experience and performance in providing these services.  We also conducted interviews 
with grid operators, academics, regulators and market participants familiar with each market.   
 
Not surprisingly, we found that AS arrangements vary considerably across these electricity 
markets. To facilitate comparative review and analysis, we developed a generic framework for 
characterizing ancillary services based on functional equivalency. This framework defines six 
generic ancillary services that are necessary for maintaining system reliability and security in 
electricity markets (see Table 1):  
  
• Ancillary services required during normal conditions 
1. Continuous Regulation 
2. Energy Imbalance Management 
• Ancillary services used during system contingencies 
3.  Instantaneous Contingency Reserve  
4.  Replacement Reserve  
• Other Ancillary Services 
5. Voltage Support  
6. Black Start  
 
For each electricity market, we compiled and analyzed qualitative and quantitative information 
on how ancillary services are provided and how loads participate and perform in their provision.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 x
Table 1: Typology and definition of ancillary services 
 
Ancillary Service Description 
Continuous Regulation  Provided by online resources with automatic controls that respond rapidly to 
operator requests for up and down movements.  Used to track and correct 
minute-to-minute fluctuations in system load and generator output. 
Energy  
Imbalance Management  
Serves as a bridge between the regulation service and the hourly or half-
hourly bid-in energy schedules; similar to but slower than Continuous 
Regulation. Also serves a financial (settlement) function in clearing spot 
markets. 
Instantaneous Contingency 
Reserves 
Provided by online resources equipped with frequency or other controls that 
can rapidly increase output or decrease consumption in response to a major 
disturbance or other contingency event. 
Replacement Reserves Provided by resources with a slower response time that can be called upon 
to replace or supplement the Instantaneous Contingency Reserve in restoring 
system stability.  
Voltage Control The injection or absorption of reactive power to maintain transmission-
system voltages within required ranges 
Black Start Generation able to start itself without support from the grid and with 
sufficient real and reactive capability and control to be useful in system 
restoration. 
 
Key Findings 
 
• The functional equivalency model worked well in comparing arrangements for providing 
ancillary services across the electricity markets considered, reflecting the similar 
physical requirements of any large, interconnected electricity grid.  
 
We found that each market incorporated all six generic ancillary services, although the 
nomenclature, technical requirements and procurement details varied significantly.  
 
• The cost of providing ancillary services in these five markets was modest, typically only 
about 2-3% of the total monetary value transacted.  
 
Despite the small dollar volume, these ancillary services markets are critical to power system 
security and reliability and their overall value to society is quite high, given the value that 
customers place on reliable electric service. Furthermore, even a small share of these very large 
markets offers important inducements to potential load aggregators or some large end users. 
 
• Customer loads are well suited to providing certain ancillary services, assuming 
nondiscriminatory market rules; loads account for about half of the total resources 
required for contingency ancillary services in the Texas and Nordic markets. 
 
Table 2 shows the amount of resources provided by loads (in MW) for each ancillary service as 
well as the market share for loads (in percent) of that ancillary service in each region/country. In 
Texas, ERCOT’s “Load Acting as a Resource (Laar)” program has subscribed sufficient load to 
provide half of the total Responsive Reserve requirements. In the United Kingdom, loads provide 
almost one-third of frequency responsive Contingency Reserves. In the Nordic region, several of 
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the national grid operators (e.g. Fingrid and Statnett) procure comparable amounts of load and 
generation to provide instantaneous contingency and replacement reserves. Norway’s grid 
operator (Stattnett) also procures significant amounts of load to provide regulating power. 
Finland’s grid operator indicated that they prefer loads to fast response gas turbines as a less-
expensive, less-troublesome form of operating reserve (Fingrid 2006).  
 
Table 2: Load participation and market share (%) in providing ancillary services 
Region/ 
Country 
System 
Operator 
Continuous 
Regulation 
Reserves 
Energy Imbalance  
Mgmt 
Contingency 
Reserve  
Replacement 
Reserve  
Australia1 NEMMCO Nil Not Applicable Nil 375 MW (81%) 
Energinet Nil Nil 50 MW (4%) 
Fingrid Nil 120 MW (58%) 390 MW (39%) 
Statnett 1481 MW (65%)2 
Nordic 
Region 
Svenska 
Kraftnät 
Nil 870 MW (22%) 
Nordic Total  2911 MW (34%) 
U.K./BETTA National Grid Nil Load provided 
30% of dispatched 
reserve energy in 
2003 
160 MW (30%) 250 MW (15%) 
Texas ERCOT Nil Negligible 1200 MW (50%); currently limited by 
ERCOT rule 
Mid-Atlantic/ 
Midwest 
PJM Negligible3 Neg. Neg. 1600 MW (100%) 
(Emergency); 
 
• There appear to be no implicit or insurmountable barriers to loads providing any of the 
four main ancillary services – Continuous Regulation, Energy Imbalance Management, 
Instantaneous Contingency Reserves, and Replacement Reserves. 
 
At present, customer loads are actively providing three of the four main ancillary services. 
Continuous regulation services is provided exclusively by generators; several system operators 
including PJM and CAISO are conducting pilots and developing business rules to open up this 
ancillary service market as well. 
 
• Grid operator acceptance of loads providing ancillary services happens gradually. There 
is a learning curve that both system operators and market participants must traverse in 
order to build confidence in the use of loads as a source of operating reserve and 
ancillary services. This learning curve can be accelerated by pilot projects, technology 
development, and encouragement of innovation by aggregators and third party providers. 
 
                                                 
1 Load participation in Network Loading Control in Victoria (350 MW/350 MW in Victoria, or 100 percent) is not 
reflected in these numbers as well as tendering of load for seasonal operating reserves. 
2 The regulating and contingent reserve requirements vary from week to week depending on system needs. The 
amount of load participation varies according to the auction results of the Regulating Capacity Options Market. 
The value shown represents a maximum level of load participation from winter 2005. 
3 PJM only recently (May 2006) opened up this market to participation by loads.  
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In the Texas market, load participation in providing ERCOT’s Response Reserving Service (e.g., 
instantaneous contingency reserve) was initially capped at 25 percent of the total requirement. 
The cap on load participation has been steadily increased and is currently set at 50 percent of the 
total requirement. Loads have cost-effectively and fully subscribed the capped amount. In the 
Nordic region, early efforts focused on very large loads (greater than 25 MW) where the 
investment in telemetry and frequency control equipment was easily justified. Over time the 
technical and size requirements imposed by system operators have been relaxed as third party 
load aggregators have developed and installed lower-cost communications equipment. These 
load aggregators targeted customers with small (500 kW) back-up generators and dual-fuel 
boilers as sources of regulating power and contingency reserves.   
 
• Compensation for loads participating in ancillary services markets can be significant, 
between $1.00 and $5.00 per kW per month in which the capacity is subscribed, plus 
additional energy payments when operating reserves are activated.  
 
Based on our review we found capacity payments for ancillary services ranged between $1 and 
$5 per kW per month across the five electricity markets. However, comparing compensation 
levels for ancillary services across markets is difficult, as requirements imposed on loads (or 
generators) to provide a specific ancillary service varies. For example, in the Nordic region, 
loads that bid into the Energy Imbalance Market and are compensated for their availability are 
also on call to provide Instantaneous Contingency Reserves and Replacement Reserves. In 
contrast, in Australia’s National Electricity Market (NEM), loads contracted as operating 
reserves are only called upon in case of severe capacity shortage or system disturbance.  
 
• Some market designs seem to have more “market space” than others for loads to provide 
ancillary services. 
 
Tightly-pooled real-time energy-only markets such as Australia’s NEM require minimal energy 
balancing market and relatively modest expenditures for regulating reserves, contingency 
reserves and replacement reserves. Other markets with market and system operating 
characteristics that require greater operator flexibility tend to have larger requirements for 
ancillary services and thus more opportunities for load to participate in providing them. For 
example, in the U.K., the British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangement (BETTA) 
requires significant frequency responsiveness that loads can effectively supply, while the Nordic 
system is capacity constrained during the long peak winter season and requires additional 
operating reserves that loads can effectively provide. 
 
• Policymakers, regulators, system operators, and load aggregators all have important 
roles in paving the way for more load participation in ancillary services markets. 
 
The markets reviewed varied considerably in the emphasis that policy makers, regulators and 
others placed on demand response and load participation in electricity markets. In the Nordic 
region load participation is viewed as a critical “pillar” of the interconnected electricity market’s 
sustainability and reliability. Each Nordic system operator has developed “action plans” for 
increasing demand response in retail and wholesale markets. In Australia much electricity policy 
is made at the State level, and support for demand response varies according to short-term 
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resource adequacy and the degree of retail competition. Both the PUCT in Texas and Ofgem in 
the U.K. have been long-standing supporters of load participation in wholesale markets; their 
support is reflected in high levels of load participation in both energy and ancillary services 
markets.  
 
System operators strongly influence opportunities for load participation through their 
interpretation of reliability rules, conduct of procurements, and implementation of business rules 
and operating protocols. In the U.K., National Grid’s strict adherence to the principle of source-
neutrality led directly to business rules and operating protocols that favored load participation in 
BETTA’s Fast Reserves and Standing Reserves markets. Australia’s NEMMCO has chosen 
loads to provide all of the network control ancillary services requirements in Victoria as well as 
for temporary operating reserves required by system reliability rules.  
 
Third parties and load aggregators have played a pivotal supporting role by providing 
innovations in enabling technology and market development leading directly to load 
participation in ancillary services markets. This role will likely continue as technology 
advancements open up new load aggregation possibilities extending even to household-level 
end-uses. 
 
• In a few cases, the market design and ancillary services requirements make it possible for 
loads to simultaneously accommodate multiple grid services needed by system operators. 
 
In certain Nordic markets, loads can provide multiple grid services: Instantaneous Contingency 
Reserves and/or Replacement Reserves and regulating power. In Statnett’s Regulating Capacity 
Options Market (RCOM), loads bid in on a weekly basis during the winter peak season when 
capacity is short. Those loads selected are then on call in the regulating power market and must 
provide hourly bids to the energy imbalance (real time) market. If insufficient regulating reserves 
are available then the high bids of the participating loads are accepted in order to clear markets in 
real-time and set the balancing price. These same loads are also available to respond in the event 
of a system disturbance. In this design, a single MW of load provides three different services 
(price elastic bidding in the day-ahead market, participation in the real-time balancing market, 
and provision of manual replacement reserves), according to the needs of the market and the 
system operator.4 ERCOT’s Load-as-a-Resource program is also configured to allow loads 
acting as operating reserves to provide not only Responsive Reserve Service but also Regulation 
Service and Balancing Energy Service (ERCOT 2006b). 
 
• Loads that are well-suited to provide ancillary services include large industrial batch 
processes, refrigerated warehouses, electric water heaters, dual-fuel boilers, and 
buildings with sufficient thermal mass to retain ambient temperatures for brief periods 
without air conditioning.  
 
Loads participating in ancillary services markets prefer a steady revenue stream and minimum 
perceivable disruptions to their core business, easy to understand rules, effective 
communications with the system dispatcher, and a sense that their participation is socially 
                                                 
4 Statnett has also initiated research activities into use of demand as Instantaneous Contingency Reserves, but this is 
not yet commercialized. 
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beneficial. Although customers tend to view all electricity markets as similar, operators and 
aggregators certainly do not view all loads as similar. Some loads are particularly suitable to 
providing ancillary services, especially facilities or processes that have sufficient thermal 
capacitance or fuel-switching capability to accommodate frequent, brief interruptions without 
adverse effect. These loads include industrial batch processes, refrigerated warehouses, electric 
water heaters, dual-fuel boilers, and any building with sufficient thermal mass to retain its 
ambient temperature for brief periods without air conditioning.  
 
Suggestions for U.S. policymakers and grid operators 
 
For U.S. policymakers and system operators interested in facilitating load participation in 
ancillary service markets, we offer the following suggestions based upon our review of 
international experience. 
 
• The regulator and system operator are pivotal in setting and administering the technical 
and operating requirements for loads providing ancillary services. Of particular 
importance is establishing market designs and reliability requirements that are “source-
neutral”, e.g., the performance requirements are functional rather than prescriptive as to 
the resource providing the service.  
• Pilot projects conducted by system operators can help establish and/or refine technical 
requirements that may not be source-neutral by testing innovative ways that loads can 
participate in ancillary services markets.   
• Transparent (and frequent) procurements of operating reserves on terms that do not 
discriminate between loads and generation are essential.  
• A predictable and steady revenue stream encourages entry by load aggregators and large 
customers. This typically involves reservation payments to compensate loads (and 
generators) for their availability as well as additional payments when the system operator 
calls upon loads (or generators) to respond and perform during events.  
• Periodically review and adjust technical requirements, operating protocols and business 
rules based on actual experience, rather than retaining historical precedent. 
• Assure that markets that co-optimize energy and ancillary services do not unduly penalize 
the ability of loads to compete in offering ancillary services, by forcing them to provide 
services they did not offer to supply. 
• Encourage participation by third party providers and aggregators, as they are a proven 
source of both technical and marketing innovation. 
• Remove any artificial or unnecessary restrictions to resources offering into more than one 
market, where consistent with overall market design, procurement arrangements and 
operating requirements. 
• Develop a stakeholder process to work through participation details, such as technical 
requirements and business rules. 
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1. Introduction 
Ancillary services are an integral part of any well-functioning interconnected power system. 
Interest in how ancillary services are organized and procured has increased in the U.S. over the 
last decade, spurred by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s attempts to promote more 
competition in wholesale electricity markets (e.g. functional unbundling of generation and 
transmission services). In Order 888, FERC defined six generic types of ancillary services and 
indicated that customer loads should have opportunities to participate in these markets as part of 
its overall goal to facilitate more competitive markets.5  Specifically, FERC has indicated that 
“demand must have the opportunity to supply operating reserves if it meets the necessary 
operational requirements, which should be designed to enable demand response participation” 
(FERC 2002a). 
 
The potential benefits of load participation in ancillary services markets include: (i) improved 
system reliability, as participation by loads provides system operators another option to support 
local reliability and ameliorate transmission congestion, or reserves shortages; (ii) improved 
market efficiency, as more competition in ancillary services markets may reduce costs; (iii) 
improved risk management, as both market participants and system operators have more choices 
in how they hedge their exposure to ancillary service price volatility;6 (iv) market power 
mitigation, as load participation reduces the ability of generators to bid up the price of ancillary 
services; and (v) improved system efficiency and planning, as the availability of loads may 
reduce the requirements for out-of-merit, reliability-must-run, and other reliability-induced 
uneconomic operations (NARUC 2002).  
 
This study examines the relationship between market design and ancillary services provision in 
selected electricity markets, with a focus on the potential role of customer loads. The primary 
objectives of our comparative review are to identify specific approaches (e.g., reliability rules, 
market designs, institutional arrangements, technologies, procurement processes) that have 
proven successful in facilitating participation by customer loads in providing ancillary services.  
We also explore the potential application of these approaches to U.S. electricity markets. 
 
This report is timely given increased interest in the potential role of loads providing ancillary 
services in several U.S. regional power markets. In May 2006 PJM opened most of its ancillary 
services markets to participation by customer loads (PJM 2006a). ISO New England and the 
California ISO (CAISO) are conducting pilots to test the feasibility of smaller loads participating 
in various ancillary services markets (i.e. ISO-NE Demand Response Reserves Pilot and the 
CAISO/CERTS Spinning Reserve Demonstration Pilot).7 Our intent is that this comparative 
review of experience with loads providing ancillary services in other electricity markets will 
contribute to this process.  
                                                 
5 The ancillary services listed include: 1) Scheduling, system control and dispatch, 2) voltage control, 3) 
 regulation and frequency response, 4) energy imbalance, 5) operating reserves-spinning reserves, 6) operating 
 reserve-supplemental reserve. 
6 In some market designs market participants can choose whether to self-provide, bilaterally contract, or 
 purchase ancillary services from the RTO. 
7 See ISO-New England Demand Response Reserves Pilot at 
 http://www.iso-ne.com/genrtion_resrcs/dr/sp_proj/pilot/index.html and CAISO/CERTS Spinning Reserve 
 Demonstration pilot at http://certs.lbl.gov/certs-loadkey-drsrdp.html 
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We also note the growing volume of research suggesting that some loads have characteristics 
that are particularly well-matched to provide certain ancillary services: the ability to be quickly 
cycled on and off, high availability levels during periods of most-likely need or highest value, 
very rapid response, inherent redundancy, and locational dispersion (ORNL 2004a).  Moreover, 
ancillary service costs may increase in the future either through retirements of many older 
marginal generation units, increasing fuel prices, reduced reserve margins, or increased 
concentration of generation supply ownership. Both of these factors argue for system operators 
to consider greater participation by loads in providing ancillary services. 
 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the methods and 
sources used in this study, including our efforts to define generic ancillary service functional 
requirements in order to facilitate our comparative review of five electricity markets. In section 
3, we briefly review the major features of the five electricity markets included in this study.  In 
section 4, we provide detailed descriptions of the ancillary services arrangements in the five 
electricity markets, including physical system requirements, procurement processes and technical 
requirements for load participation. We also summarize the extent of load participation in 
providing ancillary services in each market, including actual performance during system events, 
and a description of the barriers to additional load participation in providing ancillary services.  
In section 5, we synthesize and present major findings of our comparative review. 
 
 3
2. Conceptual Overview and Typology of Ancillary Services 
This chapter describes our research approach and presents the ancillary services typology we 
developed to facilitate comparative review of how loads provide ancillary services in different 
electricity markets. 
 
2.1 Approach 
The research approach consisted of five steps: (1) selecting regional electricity markets to be 
examined; (2) reviewing the available literature; (3) conducting a telephone/email survey of 
practitioners familiar with each electricity market (e.g., system operators, regulators, 
consultants/academics, load aggregators); (4) preparing detailed summaries of load participation 
in each electricity market reviewed (see Appendices); and (5) synthesizing results and key 
findings.  
 
2.1.1 Selecting Electricity Markets for Review 
We limited our study to countries and regions with well-established wholesale electricity market 
designs and system operators with significant experience under that market structure. The United 
Kingdom (U.K.) market was included because of its long experience with electricity market 
reform and its current market design that emphasizes bilateral long-term contracts and bilateral 
day-ahead trading for most electricity transactions, with the system operator mostly responsible 
for Balancing Services. The Australian electricity market was included because of the excellent 
documentation available and the many entry points for demand response in its retail and 
wholesale markets. The Nordic trans-national electricity market was included as it combines 
central day-ahead and spot energy-only markets with AS provided by national grid operators. 
Due to limited resources, we did not include other restructured electricity markets such as 
Alberta, New Zealand, other countries in the European Union, or the Southern Cone (e.g., Chile 
and Argentina). We also included two U.S. electricity markets that represent differences in 
design of organized markets: PJM, whose multiple centrally dispatched day-ahead and real-time 
markets are representative of other ISO/RTOs in the Northeastern U.S., and ERCOT, which 
features an emphasis on bilateral transactions and a small spot energy market together with other 
essential balancing services. 
 
2.1.2 Technical Approach 
We reviewed the English language literature for the five selected electricity markets, focusing on 
how ancillary service needs are determined and provided and what technical requirements (e.g., 
size, performance, telemetry and metering) are placed on ancillary service providers. We 
supplemented these materials with surveys and telephone interviews of grid operators, market 
participants, regulators, and academic observers for the three international markets. 
 
We prepared summaries of the three overseas electricity markets, which included the following:8 
o Overall electricity market structure, including wholesale energy and ancillary markets; 
                                                 
8 Separately-bound Appendices provide detailed Market and Program Descriptions for Australia’s NEM, the 
U.K.’s BETTA, and the Nordic Power Pool 
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o Reliability requirements for ancillary services resources; 
o Market rules pertaining to ancillary services; 
o Market statistics and trends in ancillary services;  
o Participation and performance of customer loads in providing ancillary services. 
 
2.2 Typology of Ancillary Services 
Electric power systems have two unique requirements which must be continuously satisfied in 
order to maintain overall system stability and reliability: (1) maintaining a constant balance 
between generation and load, and (2) managing power flows within the constraints of individual 
transmission facilities. In most electricity markets, these operational requirements were 
historically managed by vertically integrated utilities as a normal part of the electricity business. 
With industry restructuring (and functional unbundling), the services needed to meet these 
operating requirements have been broken out and provided for separately. The FERC has defined 
ancillary services as those “necessary to support the transmission of electric power from seller to 
purchaser given the obligations of control areas and transmitting utilities within those control 
areas to maintain reliable operations of the interconnected transmission system”, and has 
provided broad oversight and guidelines regarding their provision and pricing (FERC 2002a; see 
Orders 888,889, and 2000). 
 
Balancing generation and load instantaneously and continuously is difficult because loads and 
generators are constantly fluctuating. Minute-to-minute load variability results from the random 
turning on and off of millions of individual end use devices. Longer-term variability results from 
predictable factors such as daily and seasonal usage patterns. Generators also introduce 
unexpected fluctuations because they do not follow their generation schedules exactly and may 
trip unexpectedly due to equipment failure. The output from wind generators or other distributed 
energy resources adds another dimension of resource variability. The requirement for self-
scheduling or operator-provided scheduling by and for multiple market participants – generators, 
load serving entities, retailers and large customers – introduces small errors which can affect 
upward or downward system balancing needs in unpredictable ways (ORNL 2004b). 
 
Every market design must grapple with the optimal approach to provide these ancillary services 
(e.g., lowest cost, most reliable, lowest market concentration, greatest flexibility). Review of 
U.S. and international electricity markets shows that there are many possible arrangements, and 
that gradual improvements in market design, including ancillary services arrangements, are 
typical.  
 
While there is considerable functional similarity in ancillary services across markets, there is also 
significant variation in how the services are organized, procured, and priced. To facilitate our 
comparative review, we have created a typology of ancillary services based on a functional 
analysis of power system operational requirements. We identify six discrete ancillary services 
that are necessary in power systems, irrespective of market structure and design (see Table 3). In 
our typology we try to avoid terms with specific meanings in particular electricity markets in 
favor of a generic terminology that can be used to characterize ancillary grid services across 
different market structures and designs.  
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Table 3: Typology of Ancillary Services 
Description Ancillary 
Service Response Speed Duration Dispatch Frequency 
Normal Conditions 
Provided by online resources with automatic controls that respond rapidly 
to operator requests for up and down movements.  Used to track and 
correct minute-to-minute fluctuations in system load and generator 
output. 
 
Continuous 
Regulation  
~1 min Minutes Minutes 
Serves as a bridge between the regulation service and the hourly or half-
hourly bid-in energy schedules; similar to but slower than Continuous 
Regulation. Also serves a financial (settlement) function in clearing spot 
markets. 
 
Energy  
Imbalance Management  
~10 minutes 10 min to hours 10 min to hours 
Contingency (Disturbance) Conditions 
Provided by online resources equipped with frequency or other controls 
that can rapidly increase output or decrease consumption in response to a 
major disturbance or other contingency event. 
 
Instantaneous Contingency 
Reserves  
Seconds to <10 min 10 to 120 min Hours to Days 
Provided by resources with a slower response time that can be called 
upon to replace or supplement the Instantaneous Contingency Reserve in 
restoring system stability.  
 
Replacement Reserves 
<30 min 2 hours Hours to Days 
Other Services 
The injection or absorption of reactive power to maintain transmission-
system voltages within required ranges. 
Voltage Control 
Seconds Seconds Continuous 
Generation able to start itself without support from the grid and with 
sufficient real and reactive capability and control to be useful in system 
restoration. 
Black Start 
Minutes Hours Months  to Years 
 
 
Continuous Regulation reserves and Energy Imbalance Management continuously maintain the 
generation and load balance under normal conditions. Two additional ancillary services – 
Instantaneous Contingency Reserves and Replacement Reserves – restore the generation and 
load balance in the event of a system disturbance or contingency (e.g., the sudden, unexpected 
loss of a generator or transmission interconnection). Voltage Control and Black Start are not 
likely to be provided by responsive loads, but are included for completeness. Voltage support 
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involves the control of reactive power to maintain acceptable voltages throughout the power 
system under normal and contingency conditions. Black Start provides the generation resources 
necessary to restart the power system in the unlikely event of a major blackout. These ancillary 
services are described in more detail in the following sections. 
 
2.2.1 Continuous Regulation 
The Continuous Regulation service matches aggregate generation with aggregate load on an 
ongoing basis. This service is primarily provided by a dedicated resource, usually a generator, 
whose output is adjustable via Automatic Generator Control (AGC) or equivalent so that the 
dispatcher can accommodate the minute-to-minute fluctuations of load and generation. 
 
Continuous Regulation is essential in maintaining system frequency.  If generation exceeds load 
then frequency rises. If load exceeds generation frequency falls.  Continuous Regulation is also 
important in controlling inter-area power flows. If generation exceeds load within one balancing 
area, then power will flow over the transmission line ties to adjacent areas. Continuous 
Regulation can be dispatched (controlled) based on either frequency or inter-area tie flow or 
both. The control mechanism is different in different parts of the world based both upon physical 
characteristics of the power system (size and stiffness) and control philosophy. In North America 
power systems, frequency is typically tightly controlled (+/-0.035hz). In other regions of the 
world, frequency is allowed to drift over a larger range (e.g., +/-0.5Hz in the UK). There are 
advantages and disadvantages to each approach. One implication of these alternative control 
mechanisms is that regulating units can be controlled based upon frequency in the UK, while in 
North America, they are typically controlled through a central AGC which takes both inter-
balancing area tie flows as well as system frequency into account.  
 
2.2.2 Energy Imbalance Management (Load Following) 
Energy Imbalance Management is needed to ensure that generation and load schedules are 
balanced over short time frames so that markets clear and the physical system is in balance. 
Regardless of electricity market design, system operators must always reserve sufficient 
resources to ensure that aggregate energy supply and demand are continuously balanced. During 
peak periods (either summer or winter), the tendency is for some generators to fully bid into the 
day-ahead market in anticipation of a higher price, resulting sometimes in insufficient 
moderately-priced capacity available for final balancing. This creates a need for whoever is 
financially exposed to high prices in the imbalance market to acquire a hedge in the form of 
additional operating reserves. Similarly, in electricity markets with centralized pool dispatch, 
there is a need to provide incentives for resource owners – generation or loads – to carry out 
dispatch instructions that may vary from the day-ahead schedule due to real-time balancing 
needs. In PJM, for example, the incentive comes in the form of a multi-settlement system where 
resource owners receive a real-time Locational Marginal Price (LMP) greater than the day-ahead 
LMP if they alter their day-ahead schedule to suit the dispatcher’s real-time requirements. 
Energy Imbalance Management also serves a financial function, as the market-clearing price(s) 
establishes the financial exposure of buyers (sellers) who are short (long) in the spot market. 
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Continuous Regulation and Energy Imbalance Management, along with the operation of day-
ahead and hourly energy markets, are sufficient to control the interconnected system under 
normal operating conditions. 
 
2.2.3 Instantaneous Contingency Reserves (ICR) 
Normal system operations are infrequently punctuated by unexpected generator outages and 
transmission line failures.  Planners account for these situations by making sure system operators 
have a coordinated set of operating reserves that can respond to contingencies without affecting 
overall reliability.  The concept and application of Instantaneous Contingency Reserves is 
surprisingly consistent across electricity markets, although the exact requirements vary (e.g., 
response time, duration, volume). 
 
Instantaneous Contingency Reserves (ICR) operates to restore the balance between generation 
and load after the sudden unexpected loss of a major generator or transmission line.  Power 
system frequency drops suddenly when generation trips (see Figure 1). Since there is insufficient 
time for energy markets to react, the dispatcher must have enough Instantaneous Contingency 
Reserves available to compensate for the worst credible event, or contingency. For example, in 
the Texas power system, the simultaneous loss of two nuclear plants is recognized as the worst 
credible event and ERCOT maintains ~2600 MW of ICR.  As shown in Figure 1, frequency-
sensitive generator governors respond immediately to stop the frequency drop, returning the 
system frequency to 60 Hz within 10 minutes.  
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Figure 1. Use of Instantaneous Contingency Reserves to Restore Stability 
 
The capacity resources providing ICR are typically much larger and called upon less frequently 
than those required for Continuous Regulation.  The cost of ICR are driven by the resource’s 
opportunity costs, since any capacity held back as an operating reserve cannot participate in the 
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bilateral or spot electricity markets.9 Speed is critical for restoring system stability due to 
unexpected events, and Instantaneous Contingency Reserves are therefore distinguished 
according to how quickly they can respond. Reserves that are synchronized to the system 
(sometimes called “spinning reserves”) or equipped with frequency relays can respond almost 
immediately and provide frequency support or voltage support for a short duration (minutes to 
hours). If the contingency persists, then it becomes necessary to replace or supplement ICR with 
additional operating reserves (i.e. Replacement Reserves). All five electricity markets utilized 
this cascading approach for ancillary services to manage system contingencies. 
 
2.2.4 Replacement Reserve Service 
Replacement Reserves have slower response times but are capable of responding over longer 
durations. They are typically used to supplement or replace Instantaneous Contingency Reserves 
in restoring frequency and preserving system stability. Replacement Reserves cover a broad 
spectrum of resources, response times, durations, and activation methods (e.g., automatic or 
manual). These reserves must be able to respond within 15-30 minutes in our functional typology 
(see Figure 2). Replacement Reserves are often high-cost generators that do not normally bid 
into bilateral or spot markets and can start within 30 minutes, or loads that can be interrupted on 
15 or 30 minutes notice. Replacement Reserves are called upon infrequently but must be 
reserved through ongoing capacity payments to be available on short notice and at all times.  
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Figure 2. Cascading Contingency Reserve Arrangements  
                                                 
9 Reservation (capacity) payments for Instantaneous Contingency Reserves are typically less than payments for 
Continuous Regulation. 
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Replacement Reserves are the ancillary service with the largest load participation, as the 
requirements specified by system operator for response time and communications and control are 
relatively “load-friendly.” The combination of a steady revenue stream from capacity reservation 
payments plus the infrequency of operation is attractive to customers and load aggregators.  
 
2.2.5 Severe (Multiple) Contingency Reserves 
Severe, or Multiple, Contingency Reserves are not an ancillary service per se but are part of the 
system emergency practices of all system operators.  All power systems are susceptible to 
collapse under certain foreseeable but highly unlikely contingencies or combinations of 
contingencies. Although large power systems are designed to withstand credible single 
contingencies, such as the sudden loss of any single element (sometimes called an N-1 
contingency), it would be uneconomical to plan and build a power system that was immune from 
all possible contingencies, such as the loss of two or more large generators or transmission 
circuits. 
 
However, power system operators do consider credible multiple contingencies, often called N-2 
or Category C contingencies, and provide operators with emergency procedures to deal with 
them.  For example, in North America, a significant amount of load is attached under-frequency 
and under-voltage relays. Additional load is attached to relays that are under the command of 
system operators and can be shed “manually” within 10 minutes. The basic requirements are 
established by NERC and the exact amounts are specified by the Regional Councils (NERC 
2004). It is noteworthy that these reserves are exclusively comprised of loads (although 
involuntary and uncompensated) that respond very fast and are relied upon as a stopgap to 
prevent system collapse. We found a similar practice was used in the Australian electricity 
market, which relies on uncompensated under-frequency load shedding when transmission 
outages plus heat-induced demand volatility combine to create a multiple contingency event. 
 
2.2.6 Other Ancillary Services 
Other ancillary services, including Voltage Support and Black Start Service, are not addressed in 
this study, primarily because they are not of commercial interest to loads and are unlikely to 
become so in the future. However, these other ancillary services are crucial for the proper 
functioning of synchronized generation and transmission networks and often accounts for a large 
share of total ancillary services expenditures (FERC 2005). 
 
• Voltage Support Service. Reactive power, just as real power, must be balanced 
throughout the power system. Failure to do so can result in voltage collapse and 
cascading blackouts. Static reactive power support is provided by capacitors embedded 
throughout the grid, while dynamic reactive support must come from generators, 
synchronous condensers, or dynamic transmission devices. To date there have not been 
any loads that are capable of supplying dynamic reactive reserves to the power system.10 
Reactive supply is typically not procured through competitive markets (ORNL 2006a).  
 
                                                 
10 Large variable frequency motor drives or solid-state uninterruptible power supplies could conceivably be built 
with dynamic reactive power capability for grid support. 
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• Black Start Service. The system operator must have resources available to restart the 
power system in the event of a massive blackout. Black Start Services must come from 
generators that can start on their own and that have enough real and reactive capability to 
energize transmission and restart additional generators (ORNL 1999).  Loads themselves 
are not able to supply this service, although loads can be useful in the process of re-
energizing the interconnected system (NYISO 2004). Loads associated with large 
generators might have sufficient capability to be useful as black start units. 
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3. Market Descriptions 
Wholesale electricity markets vary considerably in their design with periodic and ongoing 
refinements/changes to market and business rules. Thus, we do not attempt a comprehensive or 
even systematic description of the five electricity markets reviewed, other than to point out some 
general tendencies and broad parameters that affect how loads participate in these markets (see 
Table 4). For example, it is instructive to categorize a market design in terms of:  (i) the 
dominant form of electricity transactions, e.g., through centralized, bid-based pools or through 
bilateral trade;11 and (ii) the extent and type of markets administered by the grid operator (e.g. 
energy-only vs. energy, capacity, transmission rights). Our brief review of these five mature 
electricity market designs is limited to a discussion of how the market design and structure 
affects the prospects for load participation, especially in the provision of ancillary services 
markets.  
 
3.1 Australia’s National Electricity Market 
In Australia’s National Electricity Market (NEM) wholesale trading in electricity is conducted 
via an energy-only, single auction spot market, where supply and demand are instantaneously 
matched in real-time through a centrally-coordinated dispatch process.12 The NEM is very close 
to a pure market pool design, as Generators offer to supply the market with specific amounts of 
electricity at particular prices, and the system operator’s dispatch engine determines the most 
cost efficient resource mix, taking into account both the need for energy and the need for 
operating reserves. The system operator then dispatches these generators into production 
(NEMMCO, 2005). For each 30-minute interval, a zonal price is determined for each of the six 
regions of the NEM. 
 
The number of formal Market Participants in the NEM is fairly limited and includes:  
• Market Generators, who sell their entire electricity output through the spot market and 
receive the spot price at settlement. Scheduled Market Generators are larger than 30 
MW, while Non-scheduled Market Generators are smaller or have intermittent 
production characteristics (e.g., wind generating units). 
• Market Network Service Providers (including Transmission Network Service Providers 
and Distribution Network Service Providers), who own and operate networks linked to 
the national grid. They pay market participant fees and obtain revenue from trading in the 
NEM.  
• Market Customers, who purchase electricity supplied to a connection point on a NEM 
transmission or distribution system for the spot price. Market customers include 
Electricity Retailers, who buy electricity at spot price and retail it to end-users and End-
use Customers, who buy directly from the market for their own use.  
 
In 2005, there were 102 NEM market participants, primarily generators and market customers,  
and about 176 TWh of electricity transactions were settled based on the pool price (NEMMCO 
                                                 
11 In organized markets that feature centralized pools, it is worth noting that a significant share of energy is procured through 
bilateral forward contracts between load serving entities/retailers and generators. 
12 In a Single Auction Power Pool only suppliers submit their bids and these bids are then stacked in  increasing 
order of prices. The highest priced bid that intersects with the system demand forecast determines the market price. 
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2006a). As an energy-only single-settlement market, the NEM is prone to price volatility, 
especially during the hot summer months. Market participants in Australia manage the risks 
associated with their activity in several ways:  (i) by entering into financial contracts (contracts 
for differences) with other parties, wherein they agree in advance a price they are willing to pay 
or receive regardless of spot price outcomes; (ii) by trading in a variety of over-the-counter 
(OTC) financial instruments (derivatives and electricity swaps) whose value is linked to 
movements in the spot price of electricity; and (iii) by acquiring electricity futures contracts 
whereby they contract to buy a fixed quantity of electricity at a fixed price over a fixed time 
period; and (iv) through physical hedging agreements with retail customers for both economic 
and emergency load shedding (NEMMCO 2004). 
  
The National Electricity Market Management Company (NEMMCO) is the system operator and 
is governed by statutory National Electricity Rules. A regulator and market monitor oversee 
NEMMCO’s operations. The Rules establish a Reliability Panel, which determines power system 
security and reliability standards and sets guidelines and policies governing NEMMCO's 
exercise of its authority to arrange for sufficient reserves. One way that resource adequacy is 
addressed is by requiring NEMMCO to competitively tender for additional operating reserves 
whenever a reserve shortfall is forecast within a six month period (AEMC 2005). 
 
Expenditures for regulation and contingency reserves in the NEM are  small – only $20 million 
in 2005. Expenditures for voltage support were considerably larger ($51 million) and even black 
start expenditures totaled $8 million (NEMMCO 2006a). As a percentage of overall market 
volume, Total AS expenditures in the NEM in 2005 were less than two percent, or about $0.37 
per MWh of electricity delivered.  
 
The main entry points through which loads can participate in the NEM include: (i) bilateral 
contracts between Retailers and end-users or aggregators, through which Retailers gain a 
physical hedge against high prices in the real-time market; (ii) participation in ancillary services 
auctions by Market Customers; and (iii) tendering for demand side resources in anticipation of 
operating reserve shortfalls or to provide network ancillary services at the regional level.  
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Table 4: Electricity market characteristics 
 
Country/Region Texas United Kingdom. Nordic region (Nordpool) Australia U.S. mid-Atlantic 
Predominant Form of 
Electricity 
Transactions 
Bilateral Bilateral Mixed Pool Pool13 
System Operator ERCOT National Grid Energinet.dk, Fingrid, 
Statnett, 
Svenska Kraftnät 
NEMMCO PJM 
Peak Demand (GW) 60.5  61  66  31  144.7  
Total Electricity Sales 
(TWh) 
350 350 400 176 700 
Annual Revenues ($ 
millions) 
20,000 28,000 7,221 4,500  
Energy Markets  Imbalance  
 
Balancing  Day-ahead  
Intra-day  
Real-time Day-ahead 
Real-time 
Annual Energy 
Transacted by the 
System Operator 
(TWh) 
40 30 170 176  400  
Capacity Markets None None None None Daily  
Monthly  
Other Markets Regulation Svcs 
Reserve Svcs 
Other Svcs 
Short-term Bilateral PX 
Futures Contracts 
Reserves 
Forward Mkt 
Balancing Mechanism  
Regulating Reserves 
Operating Reserves 
Forward Contracts 
Market Ancillary Svcs 
Transmission Rights 
Forward Energy Reserves 
Ancillary Services 
Congestion 
Management 
Zonal prices  Zonal prices and Counter 
trades 
Zonal prices Locational marginal prices 
                                                 
13 On an annual basis over 50 percent of energy transacted in PJM is based on bilateral contracts; some of these contracts are indexed to LMP prices. 
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3.2 PJM Interconnection, LLC 
PJM Interconnection operates the largest centrally dispatched electric grid in the world, serving 
nearly 20 percent of the U.S. economy from Chicago to the Atlantic Ocean and from Virginia to 
Pennsylvania. PJM’s footprint comprises a population of 51 million, over 1,000 generating 
sources with a cumulative capacity of over 160,000 MW, a peak demand of 144,796 megawatts, 
and annual energy deliveries of 700,000 GWh (PJM 2006).  
 
PJM operates a variety of markets, including day-ahead and real-time energy, daily, monthly and 
multi-monthly capacity, a Financial Transmission Rights (FTR) market, and two ancillary 
services markets – regulation and spinning reserve. PJM is also developing a forward energy 
reserve market for implementation in the 2006-2007 timeframe. On a day-ahead basis, PJM 
market participants can either submit bids to the ISO and be centrally dispatched or opt out of 
centralized dispatch by submitting bilateral schedules (self-scheduling). Any shortfalls in self-
scheduled load or generation are balanced by PJM in the real-time market. On an annual basis a 
little more than half of the electricity deliveries coordinated by PJM are through internal bilateral 
transactions, with most of the balance transacted through the day-ahead and real-time markets. 
However, the entire volume of scheduled load and scheduled generation is used to set the 
Locational Marginal Price (LMP) and determine any congestion charges that would affect the 
sales or purchase price at the delivery point. The day-ahead market helps resolve congestion 
problems, as buyers and sellers adjust their bids to minimize uneconomic congestion charges and 
submit revised bids into the real-time market. 
 
PJM’s capacity and FTR markets plus multi-settlement energy markets are useful in meeting the 
needs of the system operator, regulators, and market participants. A financially-binding day-
ahead market (DAM) allows participants to obtain price certainty for services scheduled to be 
delivered in the next day, while participation in real-time markets are attractive to generators and 
loads, who can follow operator’s second by second dispatch instructions. Capacity markets and 
requirements for LSE’s to acquire capacity reserves assures resource adequacy. 
 
PJM operates two ancillary services markets – a system-wide Regulation Reserves market and 
four regional Synchronized Reserves markets. Ancillary services providers submit hourly bids on 
a day-ahead basis that are then cleared and dispatched on an hour-ahead basis.  A recent 
development is that load is now allowed to provide both regulation and spinning reserve in PJM 
(PJM 2006a). Although PJM dispatches ancillary services on a co-optimized basis using the PJM 
dispatch engine, it allows resources to establish different prices for each ancillary service and 
energy. 
 
In 2005, total costs for continuous regulation reserves were $545 million, while the cost of 
spinning reserve was another $100 million. Operating reserve credits needed for real-time energy 
imbalance management accounted for another $541 million. Total ancillary services 
expenditures were $1.62 billion (excluding compensation for reactive power), about two percent 
of PJM’s total market turnover and costing $1.17 per MWH of electricity delivered (PJM 2006c 
and d). 
 
Loads are able to participate in most of the PJM markets, through the PJM-sponsored Emergency 
and Economic Load Response Programs, through daily and monthly capacity auctions in which 
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load-serving entities must participate, or by participating in one of many retail demand response 
programs offered by retail Load Serving Entities. In addition to the recent opening of ancillary 
services markets to load participation, PJM is also developing a forward energy reserve market 
that may provide additional opportunities for participation by loads (PJM 2005). 
 
3.3 Nordic Region 
The four economies comprising the Nordic region (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) 
were among the very first to restructure their electricity industries. Established in 1993, Nord 
Pool was the world’s first multinational power exchange. Nord Pool operates several regional 
financial and physical markets for energy, most notably a forward market (Eltermin and 
Eloptions), a day-ahead market (Elspot), and an intra-day market (Elbas). Of the 400 TWh 
bought and sold within the Nordic region, about 176 TWh are transacted through Elspot and 
Elbas and the balance were bilaterally transacted. Separate day-ahead bidding areas are 
established and any congestion encountered in scheduling day-ahead transactions is reflected in 
zonal price differentials. (Nord Pool 2006). The Nordic electricity market can be characterized as 
a mixed pool/bilateral design. 
 
Ancillary services expenditures including balancing costs incurred by balance-responsible 
market participants are significant. This trans-national system, required 30.3 TWh of real-time 
balancing energy purchases at a cost of $1.05 billion plus regulating reserve volume of 9 TWh at 
a cost of $245 million (Statnett 2006a); these transactions represent ~10% of the total amount of 
electricity bought and sold in the Nordic region.14 Each national system operator had a different 
set of ancillary services costs according to their procurement arrangements and reserve 
requirements.  
 
Loads participate in both the regional energy and regulating power markets and provide 
additional operating reserves procured via bids or bilateral contracts by the four national grid 
operators. Aggregators have started to play an important role in configuring loads and offering 
them into various power markets. 
 
3.4 ERCOT 
The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) is the Independent System Operator for the 
State of Texas. ERCOT manages the scheduling of power on an electric grid consisting of 
78,000 megawatts of generation capacity and 38,000 miles of transmission lines in order to keep 
electric power flowing to approximately 20 million Texans. 
 
                                                 
14 Total ancillary services costs for Svenska Kraftnät including disturbance reserves, primary regulation and high 
load reserves were $42.5 million (Nordel 2002). Fingrid’s annual costs for fast disturbance reserves (gas turbines 
and disconnectable loads) were $12.5 million in 2005 (Fingrid 2006). RCOM capacity payments by Statnett to loads 
and generators were $9.3 million in 2005 (Statnett 2006a), while reported system-wide ancillary services costs were 
$67.2 million (Statnett 2006b). Total 2004 ancillary services payments by West Denmark were $65 million (Elkraft 
2005a). 
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Over 95% of the electricity bought and sold in ERCOT is through bilateral contracts between 
generators and load-serving entities. Scheduling is performed by Qualified Scheduling Entities 
(QSEs), who are the only entities certified to schedule, bid and financially settle with ERCOT for 
energy and capacity.  Retail Electric Providers (REPs) and other load serving entities contract 
with a QSE to provide scheduling services, including self-scheduling of prorated ancillary 
services obligations allocated to REPs by ERCOT.  In many cases, the REPs may be part of the 
same company as the QSE, and thus may contract for energy supply through direct agreements 
with generators. These bilateral contracts are confidential, so prices paid for the overwhelming 
majority of energy on the ERCOT market are not available to other parties (ERCOT 2006a). 
 
ERCOT is responsible for collating the schedules submitted by the QSEs and dispatching 
generators and loads in real time. ERCOT also determines the amount of ancillary services and 
operating reserves required and assigns responsibility to procure them to the individual REPs.  
REP’s have the option of self-arranging reserves, but if they are not, ERCOT will purchase the 
necessary reserves on the REP’s behalf. ERCOT holds auctions on a daily basis to satisfy 
requirements for regulation, instantaneous contingency reserve, and replacement reserves. 
 
Energy imbalance is a key issue for an energy-only market based on bilateral contracts. ERCOT 
operates a “thin” balancing pool of energy that allows market participants to acquire additional 
resources needed to balance generation and load in real time.  ERCOT looks at the balance 
between supply and demand for each 15-minute interval and, if a generation shortage is 
anticipated, buys additional "balancing energy" on behalf of the market.  This process sets the 
Market Clearing Price for Energy (MCPE). REPS are financially responsible for any shortage, 
thus creating an incentive to hedge against any shortfall by procuring additional generation or 
load reduction.  
  
Expenditures for ancillary services in ERCOT are significant - $316 million for regulation, $336 
million for instantaneous contingency reserves, and $64 million for replacement reserves.  
 
ERCOT makes extensive use of load response. Load is allowed to provide responsive reserve 
(spinning reserve), non-spinning reserve, replacement reserve (30 minute response), and 
balancing energy. Over 1100 MW of loads are qualified to provide spinning reserve and over 
1200 MW of loads are qualified to provide non-spinning reserve. Over 1100 MW of load 
response was delivered during an April 2006 frequency excursion (PUCT 2006). Responsive 
load is currently limited to providing half of the contingency reserves until system operator 
experience is gained. Interestingly, not a single load has offered to provide balancing energy 
while responsive load is providing as much contingency reserve as allowed. This may indicate 
that load response duration is more limited than response speed (ORNL 2006b). 
   
3.5 United Kingdom (U.K.) 
The British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangement (BETTA) has been in place since 
2005.  Prior to that, the U.K. market design was based on a power exchange, of which the 
centrepiece was a compulsory, day-ahead, last-price auction called the English Power Pool. 
National Grid Company (NGC) is the system operator and operator of several special markets 
serving all of the UK, except Northern Ireland. 
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Power transactions in the current BETTA scheme are based on bilateral trading of electricity 
contracts between generators, suppliers, traders and customers. Almost all electricity (>90%) is 
bought and sold by bilateral contracts between buyers and sellers in over-the-counter markets or 
in power exchanges such as the London-based UKPX or other European power exchanges (e.g., 
APX or EEX).  A small amount of sales (<10%) are made in the Balancing Mechanism, a tool 
that NGC uses to ensure that supply and demand match on a second by second basis. The 
Balancing Mechanism is one of several “special markets” which NGC operates to regulate 
system frequency and voltage, provide rapid frequency response in case of disturbances, and 
provide for additional standing reserves for very low system frequency or to replace the rapid 
frequency response reserves.  Aggregated loads have been participating in all three of these 
“special markets” since the late 1990s.  
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4. Ancillary Services Arrangements in Selected Electricity Markets 
This section provides an in-depth examination of the arrangements for ancillary services in the 
five electricity markets considered, including the type and extent of load participation. We found 
that not only is each power system unique in terms of generation mix, transmission 
characteristics, market design, credible contingencies, and reliability rules, but the technical 
requirements and opportunities for load participation vary according to economic and technical 
characteristics and the ongoing give-and-take between system operators, market participants and 
regulators.  We focus on the four generic ancillary services described in Section 2 - Continuous 
Regulation, Energy Imbalance Management, Instantaneous Contingency Reserves, and 
Replacement Reserves - and highlight the extent of load participation, barriers to additional load 
participation, and actual performance of loads providing ancillary services.   In Table 5, we 
classify and map the specific ancillary markets and services in each country/region into our four 
generic ancillary services. 
 
4.1 Determining Sufficiency of Regulation and Reserves 
Continuous Regulation requirements are determined by the allowable frequency fluctuations 
about the nominal grid frequency, the magnitude and variance of the load from second to second, 
the size of the region, the response time for generators to ramp-up and ramp-down their output, 
area control error (ACE),15 and rules on islanding and zonal self-synchronous operation.  The 
U.K. imposes regulation size requirements as a function of the load condition; thus they can vary 
significantly over the course of the year.  The Nordic countries set them as a minimum size 
requirement for the region plus an additional self-provision requirement for each national system 
operator. In relative terms compared to system peak demand, Continuous Regulation reserves 
requirements were somewhat lower for PJM (possibly due to its larger size) and the Australian 
NEM (see Table 6). 
                                                 
15 Area control error (ACE) measures the instantaneous MW imbalance between load plus net interchange, and 
generation.  
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Table 5: Classification of ancillary services in five electricity markets   
 
 
Market Continuous Regulation  
 Energy Imbalance 
Management 
Instantaneous Contingency 
Reserves Replacement Reserves 
NEM 
Regulating Raise Service 
Regulating Lower Service 30-minute Spot Market 
Fast Raise Service 
Fast Lower Service  
Slow Raise Service 
Slow Lower Service  
Delayed Raise Service 
Delayed Lower Service  
Nord  Pool 
Frequency Controlled Normal 
Operation Reserve (FCNOR)  Regulating Power Market (RPM)  Frequency Controlled Disturbance 
Reserve (FCDR)  
Fast Active Disturbance Reserve 
(FADR)  
BETTA Mandatory Frequency Response Real time Balance Mechanism Fast Reserves  Standing reserves  
ERCOT 
Regulation Up (URS) 
Regulation Down (DRS) 
Upward Balancing Energy Svc  
Downward Balancing Energy Svc Responsive Reserve Service (RRS) 
Non-Spinning Reserve (NSRS) 
Replacement Reserve (RPRS) 
PJM Regulation Market  Real Time Energy Market 
Synchronized Reserves 
Non-Synchronized Reserves  
30 min Synchronous Reserves 
 Non-Synchronous Reserves 
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Energy Imbalance Management arrangements vary considerably across the five markets.  In 
multi-settlement pool markets, energy imbalances are accommodated by day-ahead auctions and 
real-time auctions covering the same short time intervals, making it possible to minimize any 
forecast or scheduling shortfalls and resolve any network congestion difficulties. In PJM for 
example, loads and generators that can follow the dispatcher’s balancing requirements in real 
time are compensated via operating reserves credits, with the costs allocated according to the 
market positions of other market participants at settlement. In the U.K. market operated by 
BETTA, energy imbalances are managed using a physical balance mechanism, which receives 
offers and bids for energy within one-hour of real-time to balance the transmission system and 
manage grid constraints, and an imbalance settlement process which settles discrepancies 
between contracted electricity and that which market participants actually generate or consume.  
In the NEM, generators submit a schedule of quantity and price offers for every 5 minutes of 
every day by noon the previous day, which NEMMCO uses together with its own regional 
forecasts of demand to determine which least-cost mix of generation will satisfy forecast demand 
in each 5-minute period. In Nord Pool, the national grid operators maintain a mix of dispatchable 
operating reserves, including a Regulation Power Market (RPM) that reserves a certain amount 
of capacity (and load) to provide last-minute power reserves for balancing. Finally, ERCOT 
operates a thin real-time balancing market that accounts for about 5-7% of the total energy 
scheduled by ERCOT in any given period. ERCOT looks at the balance between supply and 
demand approximately 30 minutes prior to each 15-minute interval, and as necessary will buy 
additional "balancing energy" on behalf of the market.  As part of settlement ERCOT determines 
which market participants were actually short, and assigns the cost of balancing energy 
accordingly.   
 
Instantaneous Contingency Reserves requirements are driven by the system operator’s 
requirements to maintain frequency within acceptable limits during the largest single credible 
contingency event. The basis for contingency planning is typically an unplanned outage of the 
largest single generation unit or transmission interconnection less any implicit load frequency 
response.16  The Instantaneous Contingency Reserve requirement was about 1 to 1.5 percent in 
four of the five wholesale power markets, but almost 4 percent in ERCOT (see Table 6). These 
differences reflect the size of the contingent generator or interconnection as well as reserve 
sharing arrangements and of course load frequency response.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Implicit load frequency response is a function of the amount of rotating machinery (motors) connected to the 
system. As frequency drops most AC motors slow down, consuming less power. As the amount of power consumed 
by these machines is a function of their rotational speed, the demand for power will fall (or rise) with falling (or 
rising) frequency, thus reducing the contingency reserve requirement. In the case of Australia’s NEM, load 
frequency response acts to reduce the amount of Instantaneous Contingency Reserve requirements by about half 
(NEMMCO, 2005).   
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Table 6: Regulation and reserves volumes 
 
 
We see the greatest variability in the types of resources utilized to fulfill Replacement Reserves 
requirements. In Australia, the NEM has both synchronized Slow Raise and Lower Reserves (on 
line in 60 seconds) and non-synchronized Delayed Raise and Lower Reserves (on line in five 
minutes). In the U.K. a portion of the Replacement Reserves are spinning reserves and the 
balance is off-line until called upon. Similarly, in the Nordic market, their Replacement Reserves 
(called Fast Acting Disturbance Reserves) must meet the minimum requirement of replacing 
depleted contingency reserves but also comprises other capacity resources (e.g., gas turbines) 
that national governments have required the system operators to procure above and beyond 
ancillary services needs. In North America, we classify both non-spinning reserves and 
supplemental reserves as Replacement Reserves. 
 
The different system characteristics, market designs and system operations procedures result in 
certain types of resources being used interchangeably to meet the day-to-day regulation and 
reserves needs of system operators.  This is true in both the Nordic region and in ERCOT. 
However, if we combine the categories of Instantaneous Contingency Reserves and Replacement 
Reserves, we see more uniformity across the five markets in terms of operating capacity 
requirements – roughly 4.7 percent for Australia, for example. Only PJM, with its very large 
system, maintains seemingly low operating reserves for contingency needs (just 1.6 percent). 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 This value comprises both synchronized and non-synchronized reserves and thus should be distributed 
between the Instantaneous Contingency and Replacement Reserves.  
Regulation and Reserves Volumes 
Market 
Peak  
Demand  
(GW) 
Continuous 
Regulating 
Reserves 
(MW) 
Imbalance 
Mgmt (Twh) 
Instantaneous 
Contingency 
Reserves 
(MW) 
Replacement 
Reserves 
(MW) 
Australia 
NEM 31 
130 Raise 
130 Lower 
Spot Market 350 Fast Raise 
100 Fast Lower 
 
350 Slow Raise & Lower 
400 Delayed Raise & Lower 
PJM 131.3 1000 
Less than 5 % 
of total 
transactions 
75 % of largest 
system 
contingency, or 
about 1,825 MW 
3,400 
Nord Pool 67.8 600 
 
30.3* 1000 5,020** 
 
U.K. 
BETTA 
 
61 
 
550-1260 (varies 
by season) 
 
3 % by 
volume of 
energy 
 
353 
 
2,90017 
ERCOT 60.5 
580-1000 Raise 
500-1,300 Lower 
 
15, or about 
10 % of total 
transactions 
2,300 1,250 
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4.2 Ancillary Services Procurement Arrangements  
The procurement arrangements for ancillary services across the five markets are compared in 
Table 7. We offer the following observations on the variety of approaches used to procure 
ancillary services in the five selected electricity markets.  
 
First, there is a clear trend toward market-based procurement for most ancillary services. For 
example, in Australia’s NEM ancillary services were initially provided under long-term bilateral 
contracts, almost exclusively with generators. During the first three years of operation, ancillary 
services costs accounted for almost ten percent of total market turnover [NECA 2003]. These 
high costs, ostensibly due to bulk procurement from a limited number of generators, led to the 
introduction of a market-based system for procurement of the most frequently–utilized ancillary 
services. Since 2001 NEMMCO has operated auction markets for the delivery of frequency 
control ancillary services (FCAS).18 The introduction of these markets drastically reduced the 
cost of frequency-controlled ancillary services, from A$110 million in NEM’s first full year of 
operation to just A$27 million in 2002 [Outhred 2004].   Similarly, Statnett introduced its 
Regulation Capacity Option Market (RCOM) in an effort to reduce the high cost of reserving 
sufficient operating reserves to accommodate regulation and energy imbalance needs. 
 
Second, in some markets, ancillary services are procured by the system operator and in other 
markets are determined and allocated by the system operator but arranged by market participants. 
In ERCOT, market participants are allowed to self-provide ancillary services; ERCOT also 
operates a real-time ancillary services market for Continuous Regulation, Imbalance 
Management, and Instantaneous Contingency Reserves to correct any deficiencies at the expense 
of the market participant who is short. Each Qualified Scheduling Entity (QSE) is responsible for 
procuring these services, either by self-providing, purchasing from another QSE, or purchasing 
from ERCOT. Market participants that self-arrange must ensure that whomever they contract 
with are registered with ERCOT, meet all technical requirements, and are dispatchable as needed 
under ERCOT’s emergency operations protocols [ERCOT 2006a]. The participation of loads in 
providing ancillary services is streamlined by two standing arrangements - the Load Acting as a 
Resource (LaaR) program for loads providing contingency and replacement reserves and the 
Balancing-Up Load (BUL) program for loads providing imbalance energy.19 The QSE (or 
ERCOT in the case of balancing-up load) has a choice of which ancillary service auction(s) that 
each load will bid into. A load can bid into more than ancillary services auction, but can only be 
selected once for each interval (ERCOT 2006a). It is unclear whether the option for self-
provision (vs. centralized procurement) is beneficial in stimulating more participation by loads, 
although the high levels of load participation in ERCOT’s ancillary services suggests it might. 
                                                 
18 NEM continues to purchase network control ancillary services (NCAS) and System Restart Ancillary Services 
(SRAS) through long-term bilateral agreements. 
19 Only loads equipped with telemetry equipment and under-frequency controls and capable of responding 
within 10 minutes are allowed to provide instantaneous contingency reserves.  
 23
Table 7: Comparison of ancillary services procurement arrangements in five electricity markets 
 
 
 System Operator Continuous Regulation Energy Imbalance Instantaneous Contingency Reserves 
Replacement 
Reserves 
Australia’s NEM  NEMMCO 
Market participants make offers at 5 minute intervals for each FCAS product on a day-ahead basis. NEMMCO's dispatch engine produces co-
optimized energy & FCAS bid stack and dispatches sufficient resources to meet requirement 
Energinet.dk 
Tenders & bilateral contracts with 
generators 
Tenders & bilateral contracts with 
generators & loads 
Long-term 
bilateral contracts 
w/ Loads & 
Generators 
Statnett 
Monthly or weekly auctions for 
supplemental fast operating reserves 
via the Regulating Capacity Options 
Market.  
Monthly or weekly auctions for supplemental fast operating 
reserves via the Regulating Capacity Options Market. 
Participants are obliged to submit bids in the Regulating 
Power Market 
Fingrid 
Generators or loads submit regulation 
bids to the regulating power market. 
Other holders of capacity can 
participate through their balance 
provider. 
Generators or loads submit regulation 
bids to the regulating power market. 
Other holders of capacity can 
participate through their balance 
provider. 
Nordic Power 
Market 
Svenska 
Kraftnät 
Annual tenders & long-term contracts 
with generators, esp. hydro 
Market participants submit bids in the 
Regulating Power Market on an 
hourly basis for the next day. Size and 
price of regulating objects (Up or 
Down Generation or Load) are 
stacked and dispatched in merit order  
Annual tenders & 
long-term 
contracts with 
generators & loads 
BETTA (U.K.) National Grid 
Competitive tendering and bilateral 
contracts on an annual or monthly 
basis. 
Operator receives offers and bids for 
balancing energy within one-hour of 
real-time. This is the only hour-ahead 
trading allowed. 
 
Standing Reserves contracted through competitive tendering. 
Synchronized and non-synchronized reserves used 
interchangeably. 
Texas ERCOT 
QSEs self-arrange or purchase from 
ERCOT in AS Mkt during Day-
Ahead Period. 
QSEs can balance on behalf of market 
participants or sell/purchase from 
other QSEs.  
QSEs self-arrange or purchase from ERCOT in AS Mkt 
during Day-Ahead Period. 
 
Mid-Atlantic/Mid-
West PJM 
Resources make hourly day-ahead 
offers, changing quantity up until one 
hour before dispatch.  PJM co-
optimizes & selects units up to the 
requirement. Regulation Market 
clears hourly in conjunction with 
Spinning Reserve Market. 
The real-time energy balancing 
market calculates clearing prices 
every five minutes based on security 
constrained economic dispatch and 
bids by generators & loads 
dispatchable in real time 
Resources make hourly offers on a day-ahead basis and can 
change quantity but not price up until one hour before 
dispatch.  PJM co-optimizes & selects units up to the 
requirement, posting the market results and assignments. 
Resources may bid in as 10 minute or 30 minute Synchronous 
or Non-Synchronous 
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Third, procurement is a two-step process in several markets - a monthly or weekly auction to 
procure operating reserve capacity, followed by hourly bidding into the day-ahead or real-time 
market. For example, Statnett’s innovative RCOM (Regulating Capacity Options Market) serves 
to mobilize additional reserves to bid into the imbalance energy and regulating capacity markets 
during the capacity-short winter season. In the Nordic marketplace, hydropower usually provides 
Continuous Regulation reserve capacity. However, during the winter season capacity is very 
tight and mostly bid into the Elspot market, leaving little capacity available for balancing or 
regulation. Network constraints further exacerbate this problem.  The RCOM program mobilizes 
additional capacity both from generators and loads via a weekly bidding process. Statnett 
reviews the bid stack and volume requirements and makes weekly awards over the period 
November-March.  Each bid accepted receives a reservation payment and is required to bid into 
the balancing market every weekday between 0500 and 2300.20 Volume requirements vary 
according to weather, and Statnett receives more weekly bids than it needs. The mix of 
generation and loads procured varies according to price, as load is represented more heavily in 
the more-expensive portion of the bid stack (see Figure 3). During the coldest winter weeks, 
when demand is high and generation capacity tight, load can comprise half or more of the 
weekly RCOM volume (Statnett 2005a).21  
 
Fourth, in some cases a tendering process and entry into bilateral contracts with generators or 
loads is used to procure Instantaneous Contingency Reserves and Replacement Reserves. For 
example, Fingrid has contracted its assigned Frequency Controlled Disturbance Reserves and 
Fast Active Reserves requirement via long-term bilateral contracts with gas turbines and very 
large individual industrial customers, typically primary industry, heavy metals, and forest and 
forest products (Nordel, 2004). At present, there are seven large customers providing 120 MW of 
frequency-controlled disturbance reserve and 400 MW of fast active reserves. The bids from 
demand resources received in Fingrid’s annual tendering process amounted to a bigger capacity 
than required, a clear signal of amply available DR resources [Fingrid Oyj 2005a]. 
 
Tendering can also work on short notice to acquire operating reserves on an as-needed or 
emergency basis. NEMMCO operates in accordance with statutory National Electricity Rules, 
which requires competitive tendering for additional operating reserves whenever a reserves 
shortfall is forecast for the next peak season.  This requirement came into play in 2005, as 
forecast reserve shortfalls in Victoria and South Australia led NEMMCO to issue an invitation to 
tender for 500 MW of additional short-term reserves. NEMMCO procured a total of 375 MW of 
reserve capacity, with conditions ranging from 1 hour per day to 15 hours per day and limits on 
the total hours of usage, all from loads (NEMMCO 2006d).  
 
 
                                                 
20 However, the resource owner does set the bid price. 
21 Statnett supplements the regulating reserve capacity available from the RCOM through additional bilateral 
contracts with generators, large industrials and aggregators. 
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Figure 3: RCOM Volume and Price, Winter 2004-2005 (IEA 2004) 
 
4.3 Compensation Arrangements for Ancillary Services Providers 
Compensation arrangements vary by market design. The most common arrangement is 
availability or reservation payments made on a per-unit capacity basis over the period the 
capacity is made available to the grid operator. For example, for loads reserved in Fingrid’s 
regulation bank, the capacity payments were $1,800/MW in 2005 for an entire year ranging 
down to $0.3 per MW for a single hour of availability. If the customer was actually called upon 
by the grid operator to reduce their load there is an additional activation payment based on the 
spot energy or imbalance energy price. 
 
Capacity reservation payments are very attractive for customers inclined to make their load 
available as an operating reserve. Customers generally are not interested in frequent load 
reductions, but are willing to offer their load resource to the operator on a standing basis for 
curtailment under exceptional circumstances. In the UK, for example, the grid operator offers 
reserve tenders for a 6-month period at a negotiated capacity price (nominated in £/MW for the 
duration). Such a compensation arrangement works equally well for loads and for gas turbines or 
older thermal units which are uneconomical except during high-cost peak periods. 
 
Total compensation from capacity payments and accepted load reduction bids can be substantial. 
For example, Nordisk Energikontroll is a third party aggregator that specializes in configuring 
large boilers to bid into Statnett’s RCOM. The preferred operating mode of these boilers is with 
electricity; however, they are capable of switching back and forth between electricity and oil on 
very short notice.  Nordisk Energikontroll submits their option price bid for an aggregated 10 
MW of demand into the RCOM auction on a weekly basis during the five winter months, 
including associated costs (fuel, labor) should their option be called. The weekly option price 
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bids vary according to both electricity and oil market conditions, but typical values are in the 
range 1000-2000 NOK/MW (US$150-300/MW per week). Under these market conditions it is 
possible to accumulate 300,000 NOK in turnover (~US$45,000, or about $1,000 per MW per 
month) in capacity payments. 
 
In Australia, Energy Response Pty Limited (ERPL) is a commercial firm specializing in 
aggregating demand side resources (DSR) in response to operating reserve tenders from 
NEMMCO or individual network service providers. ERPL has contracted and registered more 
than 300 MW of loads, including pre-testing to ensure curtailment quantity, reliability, 
temperature sensitivity, and communications connectivity. ERPL responded to NEMMCO’s 
recent tender for short-term operating reserves, and its bid of 125 MW of configured operating 
reserves was accepted. The total worth of the contract to provide reserves over a three month 
period is estimated at $1.2 million ($3,300 per MW per month), inclusive of availability 
payments, dispatch payments, and operating costs (Energy Response, 2005). These payments for 
availability would be supplemented by energy payments for curtailed energy priced at the sport 
market price, which can spike as high as A$10,000 per MW. 
 
ERCOT’s Load Acting as a Resource (LaaR) program mobilizes sufficient load to meet 50 
percent of its total requirements for instantaneous contingency reserve (e.g., Responsive Reserve 
Service) and replacement reserve (e.g., Non-Spinning Reserve Service and Replacement Reserve 
Service). In 2005, the LaaR program was oversubscribed. Total awards to loads participating in 
providing operating reserves were $71 million in 2005, or $4,930 per MW per month, inclusive 
of availability payments, dispatch payments, opportunity costs, start-up costs, and operating 
costs. Once again, this award is a capacity payment only, with additional energy payments based 
on the market-clearing price for energy set in the imbalance energy market (ERCOT 2006a). 
 
Comparing compensation levels for ancillary services across markets is difficult, as requirements 
imposed on loads (or generators) to provide a specific ancillary service varies. For example, in 
the Nordic region, loads that are compensated for their availability and bidding into the Energy 
Imbalance market are also on call to provide Instantaneous Contingency Reserves and 
Replacement Reserves. In contrast, loads contracted as operating reserves in the NEM are only 
called upon in case of severe capacity shortage or system disturbance. However, as described 
above, we found capacity payments to range between $1,000 and $5,000 per MW-month across 
the five markets. 
 
4.4 Technical Requirements for Loads Providing Ancillary Services  
The technical requirements and practices associated with each type of ancillary service are 
summarized in Table 8. We found that the requirements on generators and loads are for the most 
part equivalent. However, some technical requirements and practices represent potential barriers 
to load participation, in particular minimum load size, real-time telemetry, and co-optimization. 
 
Technical requirements are more stringent for resources providing Continuous Regulation and 
Instantaneous Contingency Reserves, as these are most critical to the system operator’s ability to 
quickly react to sudden changes in generator output and fluctuations in frequency and voltage. 
Reserves providing these ancillary services are often activated directly or automatically via 
generator controls or frequency response.  The continuous and real-time output adjustments 
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needed to provide Continuous Regulation has up until now limited the scope of participation by 
loads in this market.22 However, as of May 1, 2006, PJM has opened up this market for load 
participation and Nordel is considering a similar move (PJM 2006a; Nordel 2006a).  
 
Advanced telemetry or SCADA was required for most operating reserves, with the exception of 
some replacement reserves. Size requirements varied considerably, from 3 MW to 25 MW, but 
these requirements are relaxed in some cases to allow for participation by load aggregators.  
 
Synchronized on non-synchronized resources providing Instantaneous Contingency Reserves can 
respond automatically to dispatch signals from the grid operator or in response to under-
frequency relays. Non-synchronized or supplemental resources providing Replacement Reserves 
can respond to dispatch signals directly from the grid operator or via their retailer, service 
provider or load aggregator.  Commercial frequency response services offered in the U.K. are 
designed to accommodate frequency responsive resources that are not dispatched by the grid 
operator, instead functioning autonomously by means of an under-frequency relay. This 
particular frequency service has been utilized by the U.K. system operator for almost ten years, 
and provides the grid operator more flexibility compared to the mandatory frequency response 
service terms contained in the U.K. grid code [National Grid 2006]. 
   
ERCOT and the Nordic region have the most stringent telemetry rules. In ERCOT all resources 
providing ancillary services must have real-time monitoring requirements (e.g., SCADA or 
similar arrangement), including under-frequency disconnect relay status. Because of the primacy 
of the QSE-load relationship, QSE’s typically arrange for and manage the communications and 
control links between the participating loads and the dispatcher. ERCOT then dispatches loads 
via the QSE when required.23  
 
Nordel’s four TSOs require that each resource providing frequency-controlled reserves must 
provide extensive information to the dispatcher in real time, including operational status, 
frequency, frequency control dead band, and regulating capacity. PJM requires uploading of 1-
minute or less metering for its Regulation and Spinning Reserve markets. Telemetry 
requirements for Replacement Reserves are significantly lower.  
 
There is a modest trend overall towards reduced telemetry requirements and reduced minimum 
size requirements, two of the main barriers to increased load participation in providing ancillary 
services. The Danish system operator relaxed the telemetry requirements for the fast active 
reserves for purpose of a pilot study to assess the responsiveness and reliability of load 
customers. Elkraft also relaxed the lower size limit on any single reserve resource, thus allowing 
aggregation, in order to accommodate smaller loads. Both PJM and ERCOT require only Interval 
Data Recorders (IDRs) instead of telemetry for loads participating in real time energy or energy 
balancing markets. However, each resource within an aggregated load block has to be metered to 
                                                 
22 This is not necessarily a reflection of the load’s inability to follow minute-by-minute system operator’s 
instructions. In some cases reliability rules or grid codes specify generation to fulfill the continuous regulation 
function.  
23 The three-step communications and control chain (ERCOT-QSE-LaaR) did not function as well as expected 
during the April 2006 activation of ERCOT’s Emergency Electric Curtailment Plan. ERCOT is looking into 
how to streamline the response time of responsive reserves (ERCOT 2006). 
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verify performance, using interval meter data downloaded on a day-after basis rather than the 
stringent SCADA requirement.24  
 
Table 8: Technical requirements for ancillary services  
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
24 A drawback of this approach is that the system operator does not have direct feedback on the response and 
performance of the demand resource. 
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4.5 Load Participation in Ancillary Services Markets  
The extent of load participation varies considerably across the five markets and across the 
generic ancillary services products.  We found the greatest amount of load participation in the 
ancillary services markets operated by ERCOT, the Nordic grid operator, and National Grid in 
the U.K. (see Table 9). In the Nordic markets, loads may participate in three of the four ancillary 
services mechanisms - Energy Imbalance Management, Instantaneous Contingency Reserve, and 
Replacement Reserves. Demand response resources had a total subscribed market share of about 
one-third in the entire Nordic region for all four ancillary services categories. This regional 
average masked considerable variations across individual TSOs. Statnett had by far the deepest 
load participation as a result of its RCOM, with over half of total ancillary services needs 
provided by participating loads. Fingrid also delivered impressive results as participating loads 
provide more than 50% of its Energy Imbalance and Contingency Reserve requirements and 
40% of its Replacement Reserve requirements. SvK delivered about a 25 percent market share 
for load participation across three ancillary services products as a result of its very successful 
2005/2006 annual tendering for Frequency Controlled Disturbance Reserve (FCDR) and Fast 
Active Disturbance Reserve (Nordel 2006a). Energinet.dk has had a low level of load 
participation in its ancillary services markets so far, although this may also change as the Danish 
DR Action Plan is implemented.  
 
Table 9: Load participation in providing ancillary services 
 
Region/ 
Country 
System 
Operator 
Continuous 
Regulation 
Reserves 
Energy Imbalance  
Reserves (Load 
Share/AS Total, in 
MW) 
Contingency 
Reserve (Load 
Share/AS Total, in 
MW) 
Replacement 
Reserve (Load 
Share/AS Total, in 
MW) 
Australia’s 
NEM25 
NEMMCO Nil Not Applicable Nil/860 375/460 
Energinet Nil Nil/165 50/1220 
Fingrid Nil 120/205 390/1000 
Statnett 1481/2105 
Nordic Region 
Svenska 
Kraftnät 
Nil 870/3782 
Nordic Total  2911/8642 
U.K./BETTA National Grid Nil Load provided 
30% of dispatched 
reserve energy in 
2003 
160 MW 250 MW 
Texas ERCOT Nil Negligible 1200/2400 – currently limited by 
ERCOT rule 
Mid-Atlantic/ 
Midwest 
PJM Negligible26 Neg. Neg. 1600 MW 
(Emergency); 
2200 MW 
(Economic) 
 
                                                 
25 Not reflected in these numbers are load participation in Network Loading Control (350 MW/350 MW in Victoria, 
or 100 percent) and tendering of load for seasonal operating reserves 
26 PJM only recently (May 2006) opened up this market to participation by loads.  
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ERCOT had by far the largest quantity of demand participating in its operating reserves, despite 
a “cap” on load participation set at 50 percent of the total 2400 MW static requirement. This 
quota was fully subscribed by loads participating in the LaaR program throughout 2005 (see 
Figure 4).  With 96 participants bidding in 1800 MW of load, capacity payments to loads for 
Responsive Reserve Services were $71 million in 2005 (ERCOT 2006b). 
 
Responsive Reserve Service from LaaR's
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05 Dec-05
A
m
ou
nt
 (M
W
)
UFR Awards UFR Self Arranged Total RRS from LaaR
 
 
Figure 4: Load Participation in ERCOT's RRS Market (Source: ERCOT, 2006b) 
 
Estimating the amount of demand response participating in NEMMCO’s FCAS bundle of 
services is difficult because the FCAS payment scheme does not involve capacity payments. 
Market Participants and Scheduled Loads can bid qualified loads into these markets, but there is 
no guarantee that their bid will be low enough in the bid stack to be selected. However, there is 
some evidence to suggest that NEMMCO’s use of co-optimized dispatch of energy and ancillary 
services may discourage load aggregators from submitting bids because of customer concerns 
regarding the frequency of being dispatched. 
 
Thus far, the two NEM entry points that have enjoyed substantial load participation are tendering 
for temporary operating reserves and bilaterally contracting to provide network control services 
at the regional level. As part of the reliability safety net, 375 MW of short-term load-based 
operating reserves were procured in 2006 (NEMMCO 2006d). All of the reserves selected were 
based on provision of loads. Total availability payments for these operating reserves were 
estimated at $3.5 million. Load is also contracted for bilaterally for provision of network control 
ancillary services. Loads provided the entire 350 MW of network loading control with payments 
totaling about $400,000 in 2005 (NEMMCO 2006c).  
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PJM recently announced it has opened all of its ancillary services markets to load participation 
(PJM 2006a). However, at present there is no appreciable demand response participation in its 
Regulating Reserves or Spinning Reserves markets. A considerable amount of load from the 
Active Load Management Program and Emergency programs participate in providing non-
synchronized operating reserves.   
 
The UK was one of the first countries to utilize loads to provide frequency and fast reserves. 
Load aggregators have been successfully marketing eligible ancillary services to large industrial 
loads for more than 10 years. A key reason for this early market participation were source-
neutral market and reliability rules that provided a level playing field for participation by both 
load and generation resources. At present, load resources provide about 30% of the secondary 
frequency response service (comparable to spinning reserves in US wholesale markets) using 
under-frequency load shedding control strategies with varying frequency thresholds. By 
establishing gradual aggregate load control over a range of frequencies, the load resources 
provide functionality equivalent to the droop control of a generator.  Likewise, load resources 
provide ~30% of the standing reserves (i.e., Replacement Reserves).  Load aggregators have 
gained considerable practical experience in load characteristics of different end-users and how to 
design of aggregated load portfolios that minimize the risk of underperformance in providing 
various ancillary services. Based on these experiences, UK load aggregators are now recruiting 
smaller industrial and large commercial customers with short-term load flexibility in order to 
increase their load-based resource portfolio (Bailey 2006). 
 
4.6 Overcoming Barriers to Loads Providing Ancillary Services 
The barriers to load participating in ancillary services are similar to the barriers to loads 
participating in energy or capacity markets, with three important additions: (i) more-rigorous 
technical requirements imposed by the system operator for purposes of dispatchability and 
monitoring; (ii) reliability rules and grid protocols developed during a period when generation 
was the only sources of ancillary services; and (iii) co-optimization of energy and ancillary 
services or dispatch rules that discourage load participation because of a high frequency of 
activation and the potential for long-duration reductions when dispatched. 
 
4.6.1 Constraints on the Customer’s Ability to Participate 
Not all end-use customers have the flexibility to configure their loads for participation in 
wholesale electricity markets. Typical constraints on the ability of a customer to participate 
include: (1) the impact of stopping and starting equipment on output, production costs, and 
equipment life; (2) lack of expertise in modifying facility consumption patterns and responding 
to dispatcher activations; and (3) the need for investment in enabling technology, including load 
control and communications and verification equipment. 
 
The customer’s own constraints are often the primary factor given the considerable technical 
requirements placed on operating reserves. These technical requirements include stringent 
telemetry requirements comparable to that installed on a large generator, very rapid response 
times (seconds to minutes), large minimum load block requirements, and the ability to cycle off 
and refresh quickly and frequently. Configuring loads to meet these requirements is expensive, 
and many loads simply cannot meet them. 
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4.6.2 Non-Source Neutral Reliability Rules and Dispatch Practices  
A second barrier to the participation of loads in providing ancillary services stems from the way 
power system reliability rules are written. Until recently, reliability rules have historically 
reflected the capabilities of the generation units that were the only resource available to provide 
energy, capacity, or grid services. Such a source-preferential approach works when only 
generators participate in the market place, but breaks down when there are multiple types of 
resources available with varying capabilities and limitations.   
 
There are many examples of reliability rules that reflect generator limitations rather than system 
reliability needs. A partial list includes: 
• Minimum run times 
• Minimum off times 
• Minimum load 
• Ramp time for spinning reserve 
• Accommodation of inaccurate response 
• Limiting regulation range within operating range to accommodate coal pulverizer 
configuration. 
 
Specifying resource attributes is necessary to procure the type and mix of regulation and reserves 
that the power system requires. However, the resource attribute specifications should be 
performance-based, not source-prescriptive. Going further, system operators should consider 
specific accommodations for demand-side resources and technologies, similar to those provided 
for generators. A partial list of load attributes and features that should be considered include: 
• Maximum run time 
• Value of capacity that is coincident with system load 
• Value of response speed 
• Value of response accuracy 
• Match metering requirements to resource characteristics. 
 
The experience of BETTA offers a formula for avoiding unnecessary limitations on the 
suitability of loads to provide ancillary services. The British regulator Ofgem, together with the 
system operator (National Grid), made sure that both the market design and the reliability rules 
were source-neutral, thus providing a level playing field for participation by both load and 
generation resources. 
 
4.6.3 Co-optimization and Loads 
Joint optimization of energy and ancillary services markets is practiced in several of the 
electricity markets that we reviewed (e.g., PJM and the Australian NEM). The objective of joint 
optimization is to minimize the total cost of providing sufficient capacity to meet forecast 
demand for both energy and ancillary services. In order to implement co-optimization each 
resource must allocate its available capacity between energy and ancillary services and provide a 
bid for the total cost of providing all products. The effective cost for a resource to provide 
multiple products depends on its offer prices as well as the product substitution cost, which arises 
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when a resource has to reduce its use of capacity for one product so that the capacity can be used 
for a different product. This product substitution cost plus its bid price is included in the resource 
bid (IEEE/PES 2005).  
 
Co-optimization can have the undesired consequence of barring some resources from 
participating in ancillary service markets.  Energy-limited (e.g. some hydro resources) and 
emissions-limited generation and loads with limited response duration are at a disadvantage if 
there is not a mechanism in the implementation of co-optimization that will let the resource opt 
out of being dispatched in the energy market. 27   The problem arises because some generators 
and loads have limited response duration capability. They can fully provide contingency reserves 
but they are not able to provide hour after hour of energy. Some responsive loads (e.g., air 
conditioning loads) can respond extremely rapidly but may not be able to sustain load response 
for more than several hours. Thus, these types of load resources tend to have energy cost curves 
that rise dramatically with duration. Some load resources can be quite economical for 30 minutes 
or more but are likely to be uneconomic if load curtailments are required for four to eight hours.  
Moreover, without differentiation in the co-optimization algorithm, the load participant may be 
in and out of the energy and reserve markets with frequent load reduction activations that are 
generally not desirable. 
 
Unfortunately, some power markets that co-optimize energy and ancillary services do not 
recognize this rising cost curve. They take the energy cost supplied with the contingency reserve 
bid and apply it to the energy market as well. This works well for most generators but when 
applied to the energy and emissions-limited generators and to some loads it simply forces them 
to withdraw from the ancillary service market as they can not risk being deployed (or curtailed) 
for hours. 
 
It is possible to overcome the co-optimization barrier if the market design provides load (and 
generation) resources with the ability to declare itself unavailable for the energy markets. The 
CAISO currently does this and NYISO will implement this feature in the spring of 2007. The 
problem does not arise in ERCOT because energy is traded in the bilateral market. PJM provides 
a partial solution by allowing resources to submit different bids to the energy and ancillary 
service markets. ISO-NE does co-optimize and this could limit participation of loads in their 
ancillary service markets. 
 
4.7 Mobilizing Loads to Participate in Ancillary Services Markets 
How loads are mobilized to provide ancillary services varies according to the market design and 
the relationships between the system operator, load serving entities, other market participants, 
and end-use customers. The presence of a commercial energy services industry, especially load 
aggregators, is crucial to how these relationships develop. A pattern typical of several markets is 
for the system operator to first seek participation by very large wholesale customers who are 
market participants themselves. Once the viability of loads providing ancillary services is 
                                                 
27 This is because each hourly bid must specify the capacity block size (MW), the energy price, startup cost, 
availability, and resource-specific characteristics such as ramp rate, minimum and maximum run times.  The 
dispatch algorithm then minimizes the cost for providing energy and ancillary services in one objective 
function with individual energy and reserve constraints. 
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proven, smaller loads and third party aggregators enter the market place and the volume of load 
participation increases rapidly. 
 
4.7.1 Mobilizing Loads and Customers in the U.K. 
The pool of potential customers whose loads can participate is constrained by stringent technical 
requirements set by the system operator. In the U.K. the initial candidates to provide frequency 
responsive load were large industrial customers such as cement works, arc furnaces, and gas 
separation plants [Bailey, 1998].28  Among smaller industrial customers, additional resources 
include cold storage distribution centers and other types of industrial refrigeration.  Load 
aggregators target this market sector because the thermal mass of a refrigerated warehouse 
provides the ability to manipulate significant load blocks with very little impact to the customer.  
 
The first frequency response contract was established by Yorkshire Electricity Group in 1996, 
for approximately 50 MW. It involved large cement works with very stable loads [Bailey 1998]. 
In 2003, the available frequency responsive load was increased to 110 MW. Gaz de France, a 
demand response aggregator, aggregated 13 cement works site for this service [Bailey 2004].  In 
terms of electric energy displacement, load side frequency response has increased from 2.6TWh 
to 2.8TWh in the period of 2002-03, which represents a 29% share of the total market for 
frequency response. 
 
National Grid and Ofgem (the regulator) have actively sought to increase the participation of 
loads in BETTA’s so-called “Special Markets” through pilot projects. In 2004 the Demand 
Turndown Pilot was introduced, which targeted large customers with back-up generators and/or 
significant load reduction capabilities that could be aggregated and bid into the Balancing 
Mechanism as warming reserve. The objective was to increase competition in the balancing 
services market by increasing the amount of contingency reserve resources (i.e. customer loads).  
 
4.7.2 Mobilizing Loads and Customers in the Nordic Region 
Statnett’s experience in mobilizing customer participation includes the following effective 
ingredients: 
 
• Steadily overcome cultural barriers to participation in electricity markets. Over the past 
few years there has been a gradual evolution of large industrial customer attitudes 
towards participating in Nord Pool’s markets, from “this isn’t really my business” to 
“show me the money and we can work together.”29   
 
• Conduct frequent auctions for regulating reserves regardless of current need. Statnett 
conducts weekly auctions for regulating reserves even if the need is not very great, which 
ensures that end-users stay in practice and engaged. 
 
                                                 
28 Cement plants alone are estimated to have a resource potential of about 50-90 MW.  
29 However, some large factories and facilities are very electricity price-insensitive and are not interested in 
cooperating with TSOs or aggregators. 
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• Take into account the customer’s ability and limitation to perform. Most loads are limited 
in their ability to perform. Smelters, for example, cannot be controlled for more than four 
hours. Loads not able to deliver over the full required duration of four hours or not able to 
operate at the required frequency can still participate, but the price-per-MW paid to them 
is adjusted downward. 
 
• Encourage third party aggregators. The bulk of the 1200 MW of load bid into Statnett’s 
RCOM comes from large industrial customers - aluminium smelters, metal processing, 
and the forestry, pulp and paper industry. However, the program accommodates other 
businesses and business models, including aggregators focusing on particular market 
niches. These niches include large electric boilers, especially if they have oil-firing 
capability, customers with back-up or emergency generators; and medium-sized 
customers with controllable loads that can be aggregated. These load aggregators utilize 
sophisticated communications and control technology that allows the system operators to 
constantly monitor the interruptible load capability. 
 
• Minimize rules and requirements. Statnett does not require some loads to meet the same 
stringent communications and telemetry requirements as generators. A common 
communications modality is interval meters and an internet-based communications 
system (Statnett 2005b). 
 
Pilot projects are important because they build confidence on both sides of the equation – the 
system operator and the participating load. Elkraft launched large industrial and small residential 
pilot projects in 2004 in order to analyze the barriers to increasing demand response participation 
in the market.  About 17 MW of back-up generation and 3 MW of load curtailment resources 
signed up for the industrial pilot to be used as fast active disturbance reserves. The back-up 
generation load resource consists of individual generators in the 500 kW size range aggregated 
over 26 primarily large facilities (hospitals, computer center, airports, telecommunications or 
commercial customers (e.g., frozen goods warehouse, public ice arena).  These generators can be 
remotely activated and offered for regulation and balancing power needs, meeting the 15-minute 
activation time required [Elkraft 2005b]. As part of the pilot operation the system operator 
relaxed the lower size limit on any single reserve resource, thus allowing aggregation, and agreed 
to a less-stringent telemetry requirement (internet based communication system rather than 
SCADA). The pilot effort was successful enough that Energinet.dk will include this class of load 
resource as part of its effort to acquire 150 MW of DR-based disturbance reserves by 2010.  
 
Other pilot efforts underway by Nordic research organizations (SINTEF and VTT) are looking 
into aggregating small commercial and household electric end-uses, such as space heating and 
water heating, to provide operating reserves. These loads are coincident with balancing needs 
and easy to control and aggregate. It is estimated that there is 16,000 MW of electric space 
heating load in the four Nordic countries (Jensen 2005). These small residential loads can be 
interrupted immediately for limited duration, making them capable of providing both reserve 
capacity and balancing energy in the Elbas or regulating power markets. 
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4.7.3 Mobilizing Loads and Customers in ERCOT 
The system operator can play a pivotal role in mobilizing loads to provide ancillary services. 
ERCOT in particular has a very active outreach program, in concert with wholesale market 
participants (REPS and QSEs), that allows direct engagement with end-use customers interested 
in participating in ancillary services markets. ERCOT has created several load-friendly program 
designs as a way of mobilizing retail loads to provide ancillary services within the overall 
context of the ERCOT market design and the REP relationship with its retail customers. End-use 
loads may participate in the Load Acting as a Resource (LaaR) and Balancing-Up Loads (BUL) 
programs by contracting with their REP to provide imbalance energy or contingency reserves. 
This also provides REPs with added flexibility in terms of providing for the ancillary services 
volume allocated to them by ERCOT (see Table 10).  
 
Table 10: ERCOT's Ancillary Services Customer Interfact (ERCOT 2006a) 
 
 
Type of Service 
 
Down 
Reg 
Up 
Reg 
Resp 
Res 
Non 
Spin 
 
Replacement 
Up 
BES OOME 
System Response to 
instruction: 
 
Must 
be on 
AGC 
Must 
be on 
AGC 
AGC 
or 
Relay 
action 
Resp 
w/in 
30min 
Response as 
bid 
Response 
w/in 
10min 
 
Generation Resources X X X X X X X 
Load with Under frequency 
relay installed and capable 
of being deployed within 10 
minute notice 
  X X X X X 
Load with real time 
telemetry and that can be 
deployed within 30 minute 
notice 
   X   X 
Balancing Up Load (BUL)      X  
 
Retail customers with under-frequency relays and quick response capability can participate in 
providing contingency reserves (instantaneous and replacement) plus the energy imbalance 
ancillary services markets. Retail customers with telemetry and 30 minute response capability 
can participate in the replacement reserves market only.  By packaging the ancillary services 
opportunities in this way ERCOT is able to standardize the offering for participation by loads 
and simplify the process of QSEs and REPS in self-arranging their ancillary services 
requirements.  The participation of loads in the Responsive and Non-Spinning Reserve 
categories up to the full 50 percent quota allowed is evidence that this is a successful approach. 
No loads have offered to participate in the energy imbalance, indicating that load response 
capability may be better matched to the supply of contingency reserves than they are to the 
supply of energy. 
 
 38
5. Findings  
5.1 Loads Provide Ancillary Services Only to the Extent that Market Design Allows 
Some market designs appear to be more “load-friendly” than others. For example, a real-time 
energy-only market with a tight pool such as the NEM requires no energy imbalance market and 
relatively modest expenditures for regulating reserves, contingency reserves and replacement 
reserves. Total expenditures for operating reserves were only $20 million in 2005, only 0.5 
percent of total market turnover and less than the expenditures on reactive power. There appear 
to be larger opportunities for loads to participate via hedging and load shedding arrangements 
between Electricity Retailers and Network Service Providers and their retail customers rather 
than from bidding into NEMMCO’s established ancillary services markets. Two important 
exceptions are the Network Control Ancillary Services and the occasional tendering for 
temporary operating reserves, both of which have been dominated by participation of loads. 
 
The ERCOT and Nordic market designs have considerably more “market space” for loads. In the 
Nordic design there is a particular niche for demand response that stems from the TSO’s 
responsibility to provide sufficient operating reserves. Both Statnett and Energinet.dk are 
responsible for providing sufficient reserves to accommodate imbalance energy requirements, 
with any incremental cost not charged to balance-responsible market participants uplifted and 
allocated per the transmission tariff. These TSOs are also financially responsible for any forced 
load shedding due to insufficient operating reserves. These two grid operators are thus highly 
motivated to maintain a physical hedge in the form of load-based capacity options, especially 
during the peak winter season. This is a perfect match for participating loads, as compensation 
comes in the form of steady stream of capacity payments and the TSO’s option to dispatch these 
loads has so far been used very infrequently (Statnett 2005b).30  
 
In the case of ERCOT and two Nordic countries (Finland and Sweden), it is the market 
participants who have a clear financial incentive to acquire operating reserves, including loads.  
In these market designs, the market participants must provide sufficient operating reserves to 
cover any imbalance error, plus contingency and replacement reserves. If they do not then the 
TSO will procure the requisite amount for them in real-time, the costs of which are reflected at 
settlement. A tight balance market in particular can produce considerable real-time price 
volatility; Market Participants are thus motivated to enter into hedging agreements with their 
customers to avoid undue imbalance management cost exposure. 
 
In the U.K., the commercial frequency response product allows customers to choose the under-
frequency threshold at which the load will be interrupted. The chosen frequency threshold in turn 
determines the number of expected load reductions. Customers who plan to play an active role in 
the AS markets would choose a high threshold. This particular design provided flexibility on the 
customer side and favorable system response that approximates the droop control capability of 
generators. 
 
                                                 
30 These operating reserves were called upon to provide instantaneous contingency response just three times in 
the past five years 
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5.2 Ancillary Services are Small, but Offer Large Opportunities for Load Participation  
The cost of ancillary services provision in most competitive wholesale markets is relatively small 
compared to total market turnover. In the five markets we reviewed, the cost of ancillary services 
is between 1-3 percent of total electricity market value. However, the dollar volume of ancillary 
services markets is still sufficiently large to attract the interest of third party aggregators adept at 
configuring loads to suit niche market requirements. We can observe this targeting of niche or 
“special” markets in the U.K., Nordic region and even in the NEM. 
 
So-called “seams issues” represent a market niche of particular interest. In Australia, NEMMCO 
is required by statute to procure incremental operating reserves if any region is forecast to have a 
reserve shortfall within a 2-6 month period.  Although this is not formally considered an 
ancillary service, and the NEM is an energy-only market, it nevertheless represents a market 
opportunity that load aggregators have been able to take advantage of. In the most-recent 
tendering for short-term reserves for Victoria and South Australia, NEMMCO procured a total of 
375 MW of reserve capacity at an estimated cost of $3.5 million; this reserve capacity was 
provided entirely by loads (NEMMCO 2006d). 
 
Statnett’s RCOM market represents another “seams issue” that created a niche market for loads 
providing ancillary services. In this case the seasonal capacity constraints in a hydro-dominated 
energy-only market create a situation where most or all of the available generation bids into the 
day-ahead market, leaving the system operator with insufficient operating reserves to perform 
the real-time regulation and balance management functions. This provides loads with the 
opportunity to deliver reasonably-priced operating reserves and a regulation-down function if 
imbalance energy prices go high enough that their real-time energy bid is accepted. 
 
5.3 Effect of Technical Requirements on Loads Providing Ancillary Services  
Technical requirements for loads participating in ancillary services are considerably more 
stringent than those for participation in energy and capacity markets. Technical requirements that 
can be barriers to participation by loads include minimum load block requirements, telemetry 
and control requirements, and response time and ramp rate requirements. For example, the 
minimum size requirement for loads is as much as 25 MW in some Nordic countries. In the 
U.K., the minimal size requirement for continuous contingency and replacement reserves is 3 
MW. Although this is much higher than the requirements for loads participating in energy and 
capacity markets, it does not appear to have prevented some customers from participating.  
 
The pattern observed in both the U.K. and the Nordic region is for ancillary services provision to 
be initially from very large customers (smelters, paper mills, pumped hydro) capable of fielding 
SCADA-quality telemetry and sophisticated frequency and voltage controls. These very large 
loads appear to system operators as equivalent to generators, and their effectiveness in providing 
ancillary services has built confidence around loads as a viable source of ancillary services. Over 
time and with the market entry of sophisticated third party aggregators, additional solutions have 
developed that have reduced the minimum size requirement and mostly solved the real-time 
telemetry and response time requirements. Aggregators such as Gaz de France, EffectPartner, 
and Nordisk Energikontroll have successfully configured niche loads such as dual-fuel boilers, 
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back-up generators, and combined heat and power facilities to provide operating reserves that 
meet all the technical requirements of system operators.  
 
Pilot projects can play an important role in determining whether certain long-standing technical 
requirements are truly critical to system operators. In Denmark, the TSO relaxed the SCADA 
requirements imposed on generators, allowing validation of load resource performance to occur 
in the evening of the activation day, but retrofitted the participating load resources with a 
wireless load control device. The TSO and the balance providers, who aggregate and market the 
load resources to the TSO, were able to gain enough confidence in the performance of load 
resources that expensive telemetry technologies can be avoided.  
 
5.4 The Importance of Third Party Providers  
We also found that load aggregators (e.g., curtailment service providers, competitive retailers) 
offered important innovations in both enabling technology and market development in the 
electricity markets that were reviewed. These third party market participants have long been 
active in mobilizing load participation in energy and capacity markets; their efforts to develop 
niche demand response applications for operating reserves and ancillary services are similarly 
impressive. In fact, steady progress in aggregating load for ancillary services provision will soon 
extend to even mass market customers. Opening up these new potential loads has been aided by 
low-cost communications and control equipment capable of configuring even household-level 
electric loads to provide operating reserves.  
 
5.5 The Role of Policymakers and Regulators 
Policy development and regulation are important in promoting load participation in competitive 
markets. In the Nordic region, load participation throughout electricity markets is viewed as a 
critical “pillar’ of the interconnected Nordic power system’s overall sustainability and reliability. 
Nordel, the regional coordinating body for Nordic system operators, has formed a demand 
response working group to work with regulators and policy makers in developing national action 
plans to increase demand response in both wholesale and retail markets. The result of this policy 
support is apparent in the very high participation of loads in Nordic ancillary services provision. 
 
In Australia the entry points for demand response vary by state and are at least partially driven 
by regulators and state energy agencies. Victoria and NSW have activist regulators and a policy 
of financially supporting technology and project development for both demand response and 
energy efficiency.31 Not coincidentally these two states have the largest amount of demand side 
participation, directly through retailers into the NEM or indirectly through requirements for 
network service providers to consider demand management in their network expansion plans.  
 
The Public Utilities Commission of Texas (PUCT) has traditionally supported demand response, 
and this is apparent in ERCOT’s efforts to facilitate participation by loads in all aspects of 
system operations.  One of the goals for the 1999 restructuring process set by the PUCT was that 
load resources were to have reasonable opportunities for even greater participation in energy and 
ancillary services markets in the future. 
                                                 
31 Advanced metering to enable price response of retail loads is one area of particular interest. 
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In the U.K., the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) has supported source-neutrality 
in the design of the balancing services market.  This provided an equal pay for equal service 
notion, established from the inception of the competitive electricity market.  This principle has 
been the basis for significant load participation in providing frequency response and reserve 
services.  
 
5.6 Role of the System Operator 
The system operator influences the opportunities for loads to provide ancillary services as they 
develop and interpret reliability rules and operating protocols. System operators have a pivotal 
role as an enabling and coordinating agency, especially in the more-diffuse bilateral market 
designs. ERCOT is a key example of system operator as load participation enabler. ERCOT 
actively engages with QSEs and their end-use customers in the context of the LaaR program in 
order to minimize barriers to entry and encourage maximum load participation. We also observe 
that National Grid in the U.K. was instrumental in enabling load participation in ancillary 
services provision by procuring these services on a source-neutral basis. Similarly, PJM staff and 
their stakeholders have been instrumental in developing new market rules and grid code 
revisions that for the first time allow loads to provide regulation and spinning reserves. 
 
Nordic system operators are also active enablers of load participation, as they implement national 
action plans based on extending the market spaces in which loads can participate. A recent 
proposal floated by the Swedish TSO SvK would create a new frequency response scheme that 
would allow loads to provide regulating reserves as well as regulating power. This scheme would 
create a sliding compensation scale for customers willing to be curtailed due to frequency 
excursions – e.g., ± 0.1 Hz around 50 Hz, ± 0.2 Hz, ± 0.3 Hz, and so on. Such a program 
comprising frequency-controlled loads on a sliding scale would be indistinguishable from droop 
control on a generator (Nordel 2006b). NEMMCO has also been supportive of loads providing 
reserves and ancillary services. As noted before, 100 percent of both network load control in 
Victoria and the recently-tendered Victoria-South Australia reliability safety net were procured 
from aggregators offering loads as operating reserves.  
 
Despite these successes, certain reliability rules and operating protocols may remain a barrier to 
wider load participation in ancillary services markets. For example, the use of real-time co-
optimized dispatch of energy and ancillary services may impede the uptake of loads providing 
ancillary services in the Australia’s NEM and the USA’s PJM. These barriers are remediable at 
the discretion of the regulator and the system operator. However, this requires a disposition by 
system operators to be even-handed when considering the characteristics of multiple resources 
(generation and loads) and setting ancillary service rules and requirements accordingly. 
 
5.7 Configuring Loads to Provide Ancillary Services 
A customer or aggregator seeking to configure end-use loads to provide ancillary services must 
take into account requirements for response time, dispatch frequency, minimum load block, 
telemetry, automatic control, and metering.  Large industrial batch processes such as smelters 
have traditionally been viewed as ideal substitutes for a generator, as they are large, dispatchable, 
and can be easily configured with SCADA systems for control and telemetry. System operators 
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are less familiar with commercial loads, let alone mass market end-users, which makes it 
important to undertake pilot projects and demonstrations of the functional equivalency of these 
loads in providing energy, capacity, or ancillary services. System operators must be confident 
that properly configured loads provide a source of operating reserves that is functionally 
equivalent to a generator.   
 
Demonstration projects and aggressive third party aggregators in the U.K. and Nordic Region 
have already identified certain types of loads that seem ideal for participating in wholesale 
competitive electricity markets, including providing ancillary services. A Danish pilot project 
involving commercial customers providing instantaneous contingency reserves is especially 
promising. Energinet.dk sought out customers with significant storage or process rescheduling 
that would allow them to disrupt their processes quickly and briefly in response to grid 
disturbances, which typically have a short duration (less than 1 hour). The customers selected 
exhibited a common characteristic – sufficient thermal storage capacitance to allow for brief 
interruptions in refrigeration load without adverse effect. Facilities as diverse as frozen goods 
warehouses and public ice arenas were found to be candidates to provide fast operating reserves 
– assuming they can be properly and economically configured for dispatch and monitoring as 
required by the system operator. 
 
This finding has significance for demand response planners in the U.S., given the large number 
of residential and commercial customers with similar thermal storage capability. Most 
commercial buildings with concrete and steel construction as well as residential structures 
exhibit significant thermal capacitance that would enable them to temporarily reduce their air-
conditioning load. Although not a new approach (e.g., air conditioner load control), the 
configuration of larger cooling loads for short-duration spinning reserve activation is just now 
beginning to be explored in the US.32  
 
5.8 Which Market Participants are Positioned to Mobilize Loads to Provide AS?  
Market design, reliability rules and system operator protocols, and AS procurement and 
compensation arrangements will determine the market participant(s) best suited to mobilize 
loads. In ERCOT, the QSEs and REPs play the primary role, as together they serve the end-use 
customers and provide the entry point for scheduling the ancillary services allocated by the 
system operator. In the Nordic markets, where the system operators are balance-responsible or 
outage-liable, the system operator is motivated to seek out the lowest-cost operating reserves. In 
the Australia NEM, it is Market Customers, including Network Service Providers and Retailers, 
who are motivated to hedge themselves against both energy price volatility and make 
arrangements for load shedding as required by NEMMCO. The U.K. market provides for 
aggregation to meet the 3 MW minimum for special market participation, making the supplier 
the logical choice to aggregate customers that have the proper load characteristics but are too 
small to engage in the market directly.  
 
                                                 
32 With funding from the California Energy Commission, the Consortium for Electricity Reliability Solutions 
(CERTS) in conjunction with SCE and the CAISO are conducting a pilot demonstration project that is testing 
residential air conditioner load control configured to provide spinning reserves (CERTS 2006). 
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5.9 What Attracts Customers to Participate?  
Loads participating in ancillary services markets want to see the same program characteristics as 
loads participating in capacity or energy markets – a steady revenue stream and minimum 
disruptions to their core activities. In the case of options market such as Statnett’s RCOM, they 
also want the ability to set their imbalance energy bid prices high enough to avoid frequent 
interruptions and to guarantee sufficient compensation for any disruption should their option be 
called. Other features that participants look for are flexibility in accommodating their limitations, 
easy to understand rules, effective communications protocols especially when they are activated, 
and non-pecuniary encouragements that their participation is serving a broader social purpose 
(e.g., keeping the lights on).  
 
Different customers have different contractual requirements. Some see a multi-year contract with 
guaranteed revenues as the basis for making investments necessary to minimize the 
inconvenience of participation. Other customers value their ability to be flexible in the short 
term, and thus appreciate the opportunity to bid or not bid on an hourly, daily, weekly or monthly 
basis.  
 
5.10 The Outlook for Loads Providing Ancillary Services 
The outlook for loads providing ancillary services is good, not least because the need for low-
cost operating reserves is expected to grow. For example, the California ISO (CAISO) forecasts 
an increase in its need for several types of operating reserves, due to growing imports, increased 
forecast errors due to summertime temperature-sensitivity of peak demand, more granular 
(localized) AS requirements per FERC requirements, and the need to mitigate market power of 
existing AS providers (CAISO 2007).  
 
System operators in Europe face steep increases in their operating reserves requirements as they 
add wind capacity and nuclear power generation.  For example, the addition of a Finnish 1600 
MW nuclear plant will increase the basis for determining contingency ancillary services for both 
Fingrid and the Nordic power pool overall. Similarly, the addition of numerous new wind power 
plants in Norway will require an increase in active reserves of Statnett to accommodate the 
output variability of large wind machines. Loads have an excellent chance to provide these 
additional ancillary services, as Nordic system operators now regard loads as a less expensive 
source of operating reserves than owning or contracting with gas turbine capacity (Fingrid 2006). 
 
Conditions are also promising for a general scaling-up of loads providing operating reserves 
within the NEM. Demand in Australia is growing faster than capacity additions, a trend that 
could result in reserve shortfalls in both NSW and Queensland by 2008/2009. Furthermore, the 
sensitivity of system peak demand to weather is growing, as air conditioning usage becomes 
more widespread. This not only increases the reserve margin requirements relative to delivered 
energy but also makes the NEM more susceptible to weather-driven demand and price volatility. 
A larger role for DR in retail and wholesale markets is being supported by  state Regulators  in 
Victoria and NSW. Finally, technology for “last mile” solutions within the power sector is 
rapidly advancing. The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) has endorsed the provision 
of interval metering for all retail customers as part of its national energy policy framework 
(Outhred 2007), and the state regulator for Victoria has mandated advanced metering for all its 
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regulated distributors and retailers beginning in 2008 (Victoria Department of Primary Industries 
2007). There are also several trials underway of intelligent distribution networks. For example, 
Country Energy is fielding a Home Energy Efficiency Trial that will provide an in-home 
communications, control and information display platform capable of implementing critical peak 
pricing and load control. 
 
ERCOT passed a milestone this past spring with the first operation of their Response Reserve 
Service in over ten years. Some problems were encountered with the response time of 
participating load portfolios; however, in general ERCOT’s Responsive Reserve Service 
performed as designed. The RRS resource in fact would have prevented any mandatory load 
shedding except for the unplanned outage of an additional generating unit right in the midst of 
the emergency (PUCT 2006).  
 
Tempering these upward trends in ancillary services requirements is a downward trend elsewhere 
in the U.S., especially in the East and far West. PJM has steady decreased its spinning reserve 
requirements as its footprint has grown westward. The NERC has steadily reduced the technical 
requirements for contingency reserve from a 10-minute response to a 30-minute response. 
Finally, a WECC proposes a reduction in spinning reserve requirements from current levels of 
5% and 7% for each Balancing Area to a single WECC wide spinning reserve requirement equal 
to the largest credible contingency for the entire reliability region (WECC 2005). 
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6. Conclusions and Implications for U.S. Practice 
There are no implicit or insurmountable barriers to loads providing any of the four ancillary 
services – Continuous Regulation, Energy Imbalance Management, Instantaneous Contingency 
Reserves, and Replacement Reserves – considered in this report. Continuous Regulation services 
are provided exclusively by generators, although several system operators including PJM and 
CAISO are conducting pilots and/or developing business rules to open up this ancillary service 
market as well. 
 
The Nordic TSOs, ERCOT and the United Kingdom’s NGC all exemplify good practices insofar 
as the system operators’ role in encouraging uptake of loads participating in providing ancillary 
services. These three markets have almost equal participation of loads and generators in most of 
their ancillary services markets, with loads sharing a significant amount of total ancillary 
services revenues. PJM is also demonstrating a leadership role with its ongoing efforts to open 
up its Regulation and Spinning Reserves markets to load participation.  
 
The outlook for additional load participation in ancillary services markets is positive. Continued 
load growth, retirement of older generators, greater sensitivity of peak loads to weather extremes, 
and higher operating costs of generators all contribute to a larger ancillary services market 
overall and the prospects for more competitive bids by loads. Advancements in real-time 
communications technologies and automatic controls suitable for configuring loads are expected 
to enable more participation by smaller loads that are well-suited to providing frequent and 
instantaneous demand response. 
 
Third party providers and aggregators have proven their worth, both in encouraging customers to 
participate in configuring load-based solutions that can economically meet the operating 
requirements of dispatchers.  
 
These findings and conclusions lead us to offer several suggestions for policy makers, regulators, 
and system operators that want to further enhance load participation in ancillary services 
markets: 
 
1. Adopt the principle of source neutrality in designing markets and establishing reliability 
rules. Generators and loads should both be regarded as capable of providing functional 
equivalent ancillary services, with the differences to be worked out in grid codes and rules 
and reflected in market operations. 
2. Accommodate the capabilities and limitations of responsive loads, just as the capabilities and 
limitations of generators are accommodated. 
3. Periodically review and adjust technical requirements, operating protocols and business rules 
based on actual experience, rather than retaining historical precedent. 
4. Assure that co-optimization routines do not unduly penalize the ability of loads to compete in 
offering ancillary services, by forcing them to provide services they did not offer to supply. 
5. Undertake pilot projects to work out minimum requirements necessary for loads to provide 
ancillary services. 
6. Encourage participation by third party providers and aggregators, as they are a proven source 
of both technical and marketing innovation. 
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7. Remove any artificial or unnecessary restrictions to resources offering into more than one 
market, where consistent with overall market design, procurement arrangements and 
operating requirements. 
8. Develop a stakeholder process to work through participation details, such as technical 
requirements and business rules. 
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